

Turning hermeneutics into apologetics

Reasoning and rationality under changing
historical circumstances

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Introduction

As recent research by R. Davidson and A. Sanderson strongly suggests,¹ 6th- to 7th-century India underwent a number of economic and sociopolitical changes. These changes put the Buddhist institutions under pressure and led them to evolve new patterns of self-assertion. As I see it, the Buddhist literary landscape saw the rise of two newcomers during the dawn of the early medieval period (500–1200 CE):² On the philosophical and apologetic level, the so-called Buddhist epistemological school, and on the ritual, symbolic and soteriological level, the kind of Buddhist esoterism commonly referred to as “tantrism.” Whereas the epistemological turn was meant to oppose, at the religio-philosophical level, the growing hostility of the brahmanical orthodoxy (Purāṇas, Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya) towards Buddhism, the esoteric synthesis was designed to counter Śaivism’s strong appeal to the ruling classes, which had enabled Śaivism’s growing economic success.

¹ See Davidson 2002, Sanderson 2009 and Eltschinger 2010a.

² See Eltschinger forthcoming.

Epistemology and esoterism share a number of interesting features. First, they do not define themselves as being in opposition to contending Buddhist schools (as had been so clearly the case in Abhidharma, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika scholasticism, as well as in early Mahāyāna), but by contrasting themselves with their *non-Buddhist* challengers. Second, they both exhibit strong supersectarian tendencies by newly resorting to self-designations such as *bauddha*, *saugata* or *śākya(putrīya)* (all meaning “Buddhist”). Third, both epistemology and esoterism understand and legitimate themselves as that which, by defeating the non-Buddhist philosophical tenets and subjugating the outsiders’ divinities, removes the obstacles to the Buddhist dispensation and hence to the path toward liberation. Leaving the long-trodden path of sectarian self-reflection and inter-sectarian polemics, the Buddhist intellectuals who felt themselves responsible for defending the law resolved to demonstrate the authority of the Buddhist dispensation as a whole rather than the superiority of any given sectarian interpretation of it. Turning to apologetics on behalf of Buddhism, they broke, at least partly, with four key features of traditional scholasticism. First, they departed from doctrinal systematics and shaped new arguments aimed at defending those doctrines they agreed with. Second, they put soteriological concerns aside and viewed their discourse as a precondition to the reflective and meditative parts of the Buddhist path, this having been made necessary by the non-Buddhists’ misconceptions. Third, they abandoned the intra-Buddhistic argumentative devices that resorted to the Buddhist scriptures as a means of proof complementing reasoned argument. Fourth, they repudiated the purely intra-Buddhistic *dharma* terminology and adjusted themselves to the rising pan-Indian philosophical standards.

However, one should be wary of seeing the rise of Buddhist epistemology as a *tabula rasa*, for it more closely resembles a process of selective adaptation that reworked and coalesced older elements around a new paradigm of human rationality. This reconfiguration involves a clear-cut delineation between the jurisdictions of reason(ing) and scripture, a model of rationality based on argumented decision in religious matters, the critical evaluation of competing

truth claims, and self-legitimation. I am therefore inclined to view the 6th-century Buddhist construction of new self-assertive strategies centred on apologetics as an *externalization* of Buddhist scholasticism. In this process, earlier and mainly Yogācāra ideas pertaining to reason(ing) and scripture, as well as to a *bodhisattva's* “private” endeavour to interpret and assess the practicability of the Buddhist law, coalesced into a new matrix designed to fit redirected polemic commitments. In other words, the Buddhist epistemologists turned hermeneutic and soteriologically valued devices into apologetic instruments on behalf of Buddhism. This involved three steps: First, reconfiguring the relationships between reason(ing) and scripture; second, evolving a set of evaluative criteria allowing one to assess the reliability of competing scriptural traditions; third, shaping philosophical devices capable of demonstrating that the Buddhist path to salvation is indeed rational, and hence possible. Accordingly, the Buddhist epistemologists attempted to ground their apologetic endeavours on appeals to human reason (S. McClintock’s “rhetoric of reason”) that involved two closely related concepts of rationality, viz. *yukti* (“reason[ing]”) and *prekṣā* (“*prudentia*”).

The first part of the present paper focuses on the changing Buddhist models of rationality in their relationship with scriptural authority. Its second part concentrates on the theoretical foundations and apologetic uses of practical rationality as defined by the epistemologists.

1. Evaluative rationality

1.1.0. Let me briefly outline Dharmakīrti’s and his commentators’ understanding of *yukti*. Five points seem relevant in this connection:

1.1.1. *yukti* is equivalent with *nyāya* as “reason(ing)/reasoned argument.”³ It consists of the cognitive operation (*vṛtti*) of the two means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), viz. perception (*pratyakṣa*) and

³ PVT *Je* D264b5/P316b2–3 = PVSVT 423,9; PVT *Ñe* D51a6/P60b8–61a1 = PVSVT 592,7.

inference (*anumāna*).⁴ *yukti* is regularly identified with inference alone, so that contradicting *yukti* (*yuktivirodha*) amounts to violating an already offered proof (*sādhana*, like that of momentariness) or something yet to be inferred. A proposition that is contradictory to or incompatible with *yukti* is a thesis (*pratijñā*) that is opposed by an inference (*anumānabādhita*).⁵

1.1.2. The jurisdiction of *yukti* covers only empirical states of affairs (*dṛṣṭārtha*). Our authors draw a sharp distinction between the scope of *yukti* (*yuktiviśaya*) and the class of objects that are beyond the reach of *yukti* (*ayuktiviśaya*),⁶ viz. objects that remain out of cognitive reach (*viprakṛṣṭa*) in terms of time (*kāla*), location (*deśa*) or intrinsic nature (*dravya, svabhāva*).⁷ Examples of such objects include ghosts (*bhūta*), the efficiency of mantras (*mantraśakti*), the laws of karmic retribution, cosmology (*lokasaṃniveśa*), etc. These are variously labelled “supersensible” (*atīndriya*), “imperceptible” (*apratyakṣa, atyakṣa, [atyanta]parokṣa*), “trans-empirical” (*adrṣṭa*), and sometimes (although the two categories do not entirely overlap) as “inconceivable” (*acintya*) and “(extremely) profound” (*[ati] gambhīra*).⁸ This class of objects is the exclusive jurisdiction of scripture (*āgama*). In other words, our authors sharply contrast *yukti* and *āgama*, reason(ing) and scriptural/verbal authority.⁹ Proper scrip-

⁴ PVP D291a1-2/P347a6-7 and PVV 450,15.

⁵ PVT *Je* D315b4/P384b7-8 = PVSVT 508,13; PVT *Ñe* D117a2/P143a2-3 and PVV 57,7; PVT *Je* D310a4/P378a3 = PVSVT 497,3-4.

⁶ PVSV 167,23-168,3.

⁷ PVT *Ñe* D51b4/P60a2 ≈ PVSVT 592,22.

⁸ On *acintya*, see below, n. 42. Note that something inconceivable can be perceptible, such as the attraction of iron by a magnet, and that something supersensible can be conceivable, such as ghosts and other “supernatural” beings.

⁹ See, e.g., PV 4.108ac: *śāstraṃ yat siddhayā yuktyā svavācā ca na bādhyate / dṛṣṭe ḍṛṣṭe ḍpi tad grāhyam ...* “That treatise which is not invalidated by proven reasoning or by its own words with regard to [respectively] empirical [objects] (*dṛṣṭa*) and non-empirical [objects] (*adrṣṭa*) [i.e., *atyantaparokṣa*] is to be accepted.” Translation Tillemans 2000: 152.

tural objects are beyond the reach of the two ordinary means of valid cognition.¹⁰

1.1.3. That the legitimate jurisdiction of scripture includes trans-empirical states of affairs certainly does not mean that scripture does not occasionally impinge upon the empirical realm. And it is precisely because it does that scripture can be evaluated (*parīkṣā, vicāra*) at all. Scripture must be evaluated due to the fact that it is *not* a genuine, independent (third) means of valid cognition.¹¹ And reason(ing) provides the only means for assessing scripture's reliability (*avisamvāda*). Its reliability concerning trans-empirical matters is to be inferred, or, better perhaps, transferred: one can conclude its reliability in the supersensible realm either after having (successfully) verified *all* of its statements pertaining to empirical states of affairs, or after having (successfully) put its principal point (*pradhānārtha*, such as the four nobles' truths) to critical test.¹² According to Dharmakīrti, however, the act of transferring reliability from one class of statements onto another is formally quite objectionable¹³ and ultimately relies on nothing but the compassion of the prophet (which supposedly prevented him from distorting the truth).¹⁴ Note that the scriptures included here cover virtually all the *āgamas* and *śāstras* that were available on the 6th-century religio-philosophical market.

1.1.4. One can assess the reliability of scripture but *not* the trustworthiness of persons (*pudgala*). This is due to the fact that another person's mental properties are beyond the reach of ordinary human cognition: a certain person's truthfulness or compassion can be neither perceived nor inferred (say, from his/her verbal and/or bodily

¹⁰ PVSVT 593,20.

¹¹ PVSV 168,2–3, 173,26–174,2 and 175,27–29. See also Eltschinger 2007a: 70–75 and Krasser 2012.

¹² See below, §1.4.

¹³ See below, §1.4.0.

¹⁴ See also below, §1.4.2.

behaviour).¹⁵ In other words, one should rely on *yukti* when assessing scriptural authority, not on personal authority.¹⁶

1.1.5. (S)he who, instead of following blind faith (*vyasana*), resorts to this kind of scriptural evaluation is called “practically rational” (*prekṣāvat*, *prekṣāpūrvakārin*).¹⁷ The practically rational person is someone who wishes to engage (*pravṛttikāma*) in (religious) practice and resorts to *yukti*, especially to inferences, in order to maximize his/her chances of being successful in his/her endeavours. And indeed, this person is but an ordinary human being (*prākṛtapuruṣa*, *rathyāpuruṣa*), i.e., someone who lacks cognitive access to the trans-empirical realm (*arvāgdarśin*, *arvāgdarśana* [*bahuv.*]) but is in possession of *yukti*. The only possibility for this person to behave rationally, i.e., to minimize the risk of being deceived, is to ground his/her practice on a scripture that (s)he has subjected to a thorough critical evaluation. Note that in this period of competing claims to rationality, our authors are strongly inclined to hold *yukti* and, especially, practical rationality to be characteristically Buddhist.¹⁸

¹⁵ See below, §1.3.6.

¹⁶ Although personal authority can be derived from a (successful) critical examination of a certain person’s treatise (*śāstra*), as Dharmakīrti does (or rather seems to do) in PV 2 while demonstrating that the Buddha is *pramāṇabhūta*. As shown by Krasser (2001), however, Dharmakīrti’s demonstration aims at showing that the Buddha has become *like* or *similar* to a *pramāṇa*, not that he has become or is a *pramāṇa*.

¹⁷ See McClintock 2010: 58–62, Eltschinger 2007b: 137–150, and below, part 2.

¹⁸ Note, e.g., TSP_K 765,22–23/TSP_S 891,23–892,4: *tathā hi ... nyāyam evā-nupālayantaḥ saugatāḥ sudhiyaḥ pravartante na pravādamātreṇa* /. “For it is by following reason(ing) alone that the Buddhists, [who are persons] of good sense, proceed [while interpreting scripture, and] not by merely [conforming to other peoples’] discourse.” PVT₁ Ñe D51a7–b1/P59b3–4 ≈ PVSVT₁ 592,9–13 (see also Vibh. 406 n. 2): *anekārthatvasambhave ’pi śabdānāṃ yuktivyuktaṃ puruṣārthopayoginam evāgamārthaṃ niścinvanti saugatā na paropadeśamātreṇa* /. “Although the words [of their scriptures] can be [as] polysemic [as those of the Veda], the Buddhists ascertain, for [their] scriptures, only a meaning that is rational [and] serves a human goal, [but do] not[, contrary to their Mīmāṃsa-

1.2.0. If one considers the status and uses of *yukti* and *āgama* in Abhidharma and Yogācāra literature until the end of the 5th century CE, this complex of ideas comes very close to reflecting a “paradigm shift.” Most of the above-mentioned features can be traced back to earlier, mainly Yogācāra sources. Their coalescence around the matrix of scriptural evaluation in a pluralistic and polemical context is strikingly innovative.

1.2.1. Until the end of the 5th century, Yogācāra intellectuals (including Vasubandhu, the *kośakāra*) generally recognized three means of valid cognition, viz. perception, inference and scripture ([*āpt*] *āgama*, etc.),¹⁹ sometimes four (the same plus analogy [*upamāna*])²⁰

ka opponents,] merely [follow] the teaching of others.” PVT Ñe D51a6/P59a8–b1 = PVSVṬ 592,7: *paṇḍitāḥ prekṣāpūrvakāriṇo bauddhāḥ ...* “The wise(/learned) [and] practically rational Buddhists.” Concerning rival (Mīmāṃsaka) claims to having the privilege of rationality, note, e.g., TS_K 3241–3243/TS_S 3240–3242: *tasmin dhyānasamāpanne cintāratnavad āsthite / niścaranti yathākāmaṃ kutyādibhyo ’pi deśanāḥ // tābhir jijñāsītān arthān sarvān jānanti mānavāḥ / hitāni ca yathābhavyaṃ kṣipram āsraddadhānās tu ye yuktīḥ prārthayāmahe //* “When the [Buddha], as the wish-fulfilling gem, dwells [deeply] absorbed in contemplation, [his] teachings issue at will even from the walls [so that] human beings know from them all the things they wish to know, and quickly obtain what is profitable [to them] according to [their] needs. To say such things, however, sounds beautiful to [blind] believers, but we, who are looking for reasons, are not [blind] believers.” On this passage, see McClintock 2010: 357–358 and Kataoka 2011: II.371–372 nn. 430, 431.

¹⁹ BoBh D25,17/W37,25–26, MAV 3.12b, MAVBh 42,11–12, MAVṬ 128,17–21, ASBh 152,27, 153,1 and 153,5. According to Frauwallner (1957), Vasubandhu had already restricted the number of *pramāṇas* from three to two in his *Vādavidhi*. But this might well be another case of Frauwallner’s use of the *argumentum a silentio*: the fact that no fragment dealing with (*āpt*)*āgama* is available to us does not mean that the original *Vādavidhi* did not address scripture as a third means of valid cognition. Be that as it may, Vasubandhu clearly acknowledges three means of valid cognition in AKBh 76,24–25 and VY P102b6–7/L173,16–17.

²⁰ See *UH/*PS 13,3–14,17. As far as I am aware, the *UH/*PS contains no hint at its sectarian and/or doctrinal affiliation.

and maybe even five,²¹ but *never* only two, contrary to the Buddhist epistemologists. These three means of valid cognition enter, *with equal rights*, the hermeneutic and argumentative complex of *yukti*, most conspicuously in the form of the so-called reason(ing) that proves by means of arguments (*upapattisādhanayukti*). In other words, scripture qua *pramāṇa* belongs to reason(ing). The interpretative complex of reason(ing) provides a *bodhisattva* with the heuristic tools needed for pondering on the Buddhist scriptures that he has learnt earlier (at the stage of learning or “listening” known as the “insight born of listening” [*śrutamayī prajñā*]). At this stage of reflection, the *bodhisattva* analyzes scriptures in order to work out the intellectual (and ultimately soteric) contents that he will subsequently cultivate or “meditate” upon (at the stage of cultivation known as the “insight born of [mental] cultivation” [*bhāvanāmayī prajñā*]).²²

²¹ According to the HV (4,15–16), proof (*sādhana*) is comprised of eight elements: thesis (*pratijñā*), reason (*hetu*), example (*udāharaṇa*), similarity (*sārūpya*), dissimilarity (*vairūpya*), perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), and scripture (*āptāgama*). However, items 1–3 and 4–8 do not belong to the same level, for the latter, as in the *UH, are that which provides justification for the reason (HV 5,3–5: *hetuḥ katamaḥ. yas tasyaiva pratijñātasyārthasya siddhaya udāharaṇāśritaḥ sārūpya-vairūpyato vā pratyakṣato vānumānato vāptāgamo vā hito yuktivādaḥ*. “What does the reason consist of? It is the justification that, based on an example and drawn from similarity and dissimilarity, or perception, or inference, or scripture, is aimed at establishing the point [at stake] in the thesis.”) According to whether one counts *sārūpya* and *vairūpya* as distinct items (they sometimes occur in a singular *dvandva* compound, sometimes separately), the *pramāṇas* amount to four or five. Note, however, that only *pratyakṣa* is explicitly termed a *pramāṇa* (HV 7,22; 11,3).

²² AKBh 334,16–19: *satyāni hi draṣṭukāma ādita eva śīlaṃ pālayati / tataḥ satyadarśanasyānulomaṃ śrutam udgrhṇāty arthaṃ vā śṛṇoti / śrutvā cintayaty aviparītaṃ cintayitvā bhāvanāyāṃ prayujyate / ... śrutamayīṃ prajñāṃ niśritya cintāmayī jāyate / cintāmayīṃ niśritya bhāvanāmayī jāyate /*. “He who desires to see the truths should indeed keep the precepts from the very beginning. Then he learns the word (*śruta*) that is conducive to the vision of the truths, or he listens to its meaning. Having heard, he reflects. Having correctly reflected, he gives himself up to [mental] cultivation. Based on the insight born of listening, there arises the insight born of reflection; based on the [insight] born of reflection,

As we can see, reason(ing) is subordinate to soteriology. It is an interpretative device applied to an already accepted religious authority. There is no question here of evaluating non-Buddhist scriptures, not even of putting the Buddhist dispensation to critical test. In the stage of rational reflection, reason(ing) is required to filter and analyze mechanically learnt scriptural items so that these can be turned into salvational intellectual contents. What does *yukti* consist of? Yogācāra texts provide a fourfold analysis of reason(ing). The ŚrBh spells this out as follows:

How is one to reflect on the teaching of the *skandhas* by means of the reflection consisting of an examination through reason(ing)? One is to examine [it] by means of four [types of] reason(ing). – Which four? – By means of reason(ing) on(/of) dependence (*apekṣāyukti*), reason(ing) on(/of) the production of an effect (*kāryakaraṇayukti*), reason(ing) that proves by means of arguments (*upapattisādhanayukti*), and reason(ing) on(/of) the fundamental nature of things (*dharmatāyukti*).²³

there arises the insight born of [mental] cultivation.” Vasubandhu’s own position on the three successive insights appears at AKBh 335,4–6: *āptavacanaprāmāṇyajātaniścayaḥ śrutamayī / yuktinidhyānaś cintāmayī / samādhijo bhāvanāmayīti /*. “The [insight] born of listening is a certitude arisen from the authority of the statements of a trustworthy [person]; the [insight] born of reflection is a [certitude] arisen from an investigation through reason(ing); the [insight] born of [mental] cultivation is a [certitude] arisen from [psychic] concentration.” On the expression *yuktinidhāna*, see also MSABh 82,1–4.

²³ ŚrBh 118*,10–13/141,7–10 (ŚrBh_T D57b2–3/P68a1–2): *katham yukty-upaparīkṣākārayā cintayā skandhadeśanāṃ cintayati / catasṛbhir yuktibhir upaparīkṣate / katamābhiś catasṛbhiḥ / yad utāpekṣāyuktyā kāryakaraṇa⁽¹⁾yuktyopapattisādhanayuktyā dharmatāyuktyā /*

⁽¹⁾As Sakuma (1990: II 8 n. 36) has rightly pointed out, one must read °*karaṇa*° instead of °*kāraṇa*°.

On the four *yuktis*, see Oberhammer et al. 1991: 74b–76a, 1996: 77a–78b, 1996: 40b–42b, 1996: 124a–125b and 2006: 93–96, Sakuma 1990: II.99–102 nn. 596–605, Yoshimizu 1996: 114–119 n. 85, Kapstein 2003: 324–329, Deleanu 2006: II.494–495 n. 74, Nance 2007: 153–156. See also MSABh 58,5–12 on MSA 19.43–46. On *yukti* in general, see Scherrer-Schaub 1981 and Nance 2007.

Leaving three of the four types of reason(ing) out of consideration, let me briefly focus on the *upapattisādhanayukti*, “reason(ing) that proves by means of arguments,” which provides us with a useful insight into the early Yogācāra way of dealing with reason(ing) and scripture. The ŚrBh defines it as follows:

By means of the three means of valid cognition, viz. scripture of a trustworthy [person], perception and inference, [a practitioner] examines [the fact] that the *skandhas* are impermanent, [and/or] that they are produced in dependence [on causes and conditions, and are] unsatisfactory, empty and selfless. By means of these three means of valid cognition, which are subordinate to [particular] arguments (*upapatti*) [and] convince (*hṛdayagrāhaka*) wise [people], one carries out probative determinations, viz. of the *skandhas*’ being impermanent, or produced in dependence [on causes and conditions], or unsatisfactory, or empty, or selfless. This is termed a reason(ing) that proves by means of arguments.²⁴

Were it not for the inclusion of scripture as a legitimate means of proof, the *upapattisādhanayukti* would seem very close to the epistemologists’ understanding of *yukti* as an argumentative device resorting to the means of valid cognition. This difference cannot be overestimated, however, since it is a reflection of the very distinct meanings of the two *yukti* complexes: whereas the *upapattisādhanayukti* is made subservient to the *cintāmayī prajñā*, i.e., to the soteriologically valued *personal* reflection of the *yogin* on *Buddhist* scriptures that he already trusts, the epistemologists’ *yukti* serves the polemical and apologetic purpose of assessing both Buddhist *and*

²⁴ ŚrBh 119*,14–120*,1/142,12–143,3 (ŚrBh_T D58a1–4/P68b3–6): *upapattisādhanayuktiḥ katamā / anityāḥ skandhā iti pratīyasamutpannā duḥkhāḥ śūnyānātmāna iti tribhiḥ pramāṇair upaparīkṣate yad utāptāgamena pratyakṣeṇānumānena ca / ebhis tribhiḥ pramāṇair upapattiyuktaiḥ satāṃ hṛdayagrāhakair vyavasthāpanā sādhanā kriyate yad uta skandhānityatāyā vā pratīyasamutpannatāyā vā duḥkhatāyā vā śūnyatāyā vānātmatāyā vā / iyam ucyata upapattisādhanayuktiḥ /*. Note also MSABh 168,9–10: *upapattisādhanayuktiḥ pratyakṣādibhiḥ pramāṇaiḥ parīkṣā /*. “The *upapattisādhanayukti* is an examination [carried out] by means of *pramāṇas* such as direct perception.” See also SNS 10.7, 155,23–25 and 157,30–32. On the SNS’s understanding of the *upapattisādhanayukti*, see Steinkellner 1988: II.14–19 and Yoshimizu 2010.

non-Buddhist scriptures.²⁵ Moreover, whereas early Yogācāra views scripture as a means of proof working additionally but co-equally to perception and inference, the epistemologists deny scripture any probative value, at least as far as the empirical sphere is concerned.

1.2.2. The close association of reason(ing) and scripture in doctrinal argumentation is even clearer in the so-called *yukti-āgama* proof strategy that permeates Abhidharma and Yogācāra works until the end of the 5th century. As C. Cox has it,

“doctrinal discussions utilized a dual technique of appealing to the co-equal authorities of both scripture (*āgama*) and reasoned argument (*yukti*) ... [E]ven for the mature Abhidharma texts of Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra, reasoned argument could not stand alone in the proof of doctrinal points. Quite the contrary, proof by recourse to and reanalysis of scriptural passages (*āgama*) continued, even in the later Abhidharma materials, to occupy the predominant position in doctrinal debate.”²⁶

The important point here is the fact that in this method, reason(ing) and scripture are *jointly* (though most often successively) used to make one’s point: the doctrines arrived at through reason(ing) are supposedly and expectedly the same as those laid down in the scriptures quoted. In other words, the scope of *yukti* is co-extensive to that of *āgama*. Far from ranging over different kinds of objects, both have

²⁵ But see below, §§2.5.1–2.

²⁶ Cox 1995: 14–15. Note, e.g., BoBh D32,24–25 and 33,9/W48,9–10, 11, 23: *āptāgamato ’pi nirabhilāpyasvabhāvāḥ sarvadharmā veditavyāḥ / yathoktaṃ bhagavatā... bhavasamkrāntisūtre ... arthavargīyeṣu ...*; MSABh 158,16–17: *evaṃ tāvad yuktīm āsṛitya dravyataḥ pudgalo nopalabhyate /* (see Eltschinger 2010b: 322); MSaṅg 26,28–30 and 27,18: *luṅ daṅ rigs pas dpag par bya ste / de la luṅ ni ... luṅ ’dis rigs pa yaṅ bstan pa yin no // ’di ltar ...* (see Lamotte 1973: 93 and 95); AKBh 120,15–16: *tan neṣyate / kiṃ kāraṇam / yuktitaś cāgamataś ca / tatra tāvad yuktīm niśṛityocyate ...* (see Kośa III 33); AKBh 372,13: *iyam tāvad yuktiḥ / āgamo ’py ayam ...* (see Kośa IV 250); TrBh 114/*39,14–15: *sarvabījakaṃ na caḥsurādivijñānam iti kuta etat / āgamād yuktitaś ca / uktaṃ hi bhagavatābhidharmasūtre ...* (see Jacobi 1932: 50). This remains true, e.g., of the 6th- to 7th-century Mādhyamika philosopher Candrakīrti (see May 1959: 73–77, 95–96, 104–105, 141–142, 156–157, 168, 177–178, 203–205, 247–250, 296–297) as well as of later Mādhyamika works.

the same material jurisdiction. This methodology was certainly not without problems, however. In addition to requiring sophisticated hermeneutic devices such as the distinction between explicit/direct meaning (*nītārtha*) and implicit/intentional meaning (*neyārtha*), the *yukti-āgama* proof strategy often came up against the problem of “canonicity,” for the various Buddhist denominations did not all recognize the same texts as authoritative, i.e., as *āgama* or *buddhavacana*, a fact best exemplified in an interesting dialogue found in AKBh 9.²⁷ To the best of my knowledge, however, this method was never called into question by the Buddhist intellectuals themselves, and thus we can surmise that it met their dialectical needs. However, with the exception of Mādhyamika literature (and Kamalaśīla’s *prastāvanā* on the TS), the *yukti-āgama* method nearly died out in

²⁷ AKBh 466,17–24/LE78,1–12: *na vai ta enaṃ⁽¹⁾ granthaṃ pramāṇaṃ kurvanti / kiṃ kāraṇaṃ / nāsmākam ayaṃ nikāye paṭhyata iti / kiṃ punas teṣāṃ nikāya eva pramāṇaṃ āhosvid buddhavacanam / yadi nikāya eva pramāṇaṃ na tarhi teṣāṃ buddhaḥ śāstā / na ca te śākyaputrīyā bhavanti / atha buddhavacanam pramāṇam / ayaṃ granthaḥ kasmān na pramāṇam / na hi kilaitad buddhavacanam iti / kiṃ kāraṇaṃ / nāsmākam nikāye paṭhyata iti / ayam anyāyo vartate / ko ’trānyāyaḥ / yo hi granthaḥ sarveṣu nikāyāntareṣv āmnāyate na ca sūtraṃ dharmatām vā bādhathe so ’smābhir apāṭhān na buddhavacanam iti vacanaṃ kevalaṃ sāhasamātram /.*

⁽¹⁾em. < Tib. (*di*) : *evaṃ* Eds.

“The [Vātsīputrīyas] do not take this text as authoritative. [But] why? [They say:] ‘The [text that you cite from] is not read(/recited) in our sect.’ But[, we ask,] is it their sect that is authoritative, or the word of the Buddha? If it is [their] sect that is authoritative, then the Buddha is not their teacher and they are not Buddhists (*śākyaputrīya*). But if the word of the Buddha is authoritative, why is the text [we cite from] not authoritative [for them]? Because, they say (*kila*), this is not the word of the Buddha. [But] why? [They say:] ‘It is not read in our sect.’ [Now,] this is unjustified. [And] what is unjustified here? Because to claim[, as they do,] that a text that is transmitted in all other sects and contradicts neither the *sūtra* nor the fundamental nature [of things] is not the word of the Buddha on the grounds that they (*asmābhiḥ*) do not read it, [this] is purely and simply inconsiderate.” On the text in question, see AKBh 466,14–17/LE76,6–9 and *Kośa* V 250–252, MSABh 158,22–25 and Eltschinger 2010b: 323–324 (+ n. 103).

6th-century and post-6th-century philosophical literature, along with traditional scholastics itself (after the 6th century, Abhidharma turns into a petrified study of Vasubandhu's AKBh, while Yogācāra scholasticism merges into epistemology). This is in fact hardly surprising granted that this device was meant for purely intra-Buddhistic polemical purposes (as the recourse to scriptures sufficiently testifies) and can, as the *upapattisādhanayukti*, be interpreted as mirroring the soteriological concerns inherent in insight born of reflection. At least according to the 8th-century philosopher Kamalaśīla,²⁸ this method amounts to nothing other than insight born of reflection by means of which a *yogin* penetrates (*nirvedhayati*) the explicit and intentional meanings (*nītaneyārtha*) and ascertains (*niśCI*) the real meaning in order to dispel any possible doubts (*vicikitsā*) before he proceeds to mental cultivation (*bhāvanā*). As Kamalaśīla spells it out,

it is the real nature of entities that should be cultivated [by the *yogin*] after he has pondered [on it] by means of insight born of reflection, i.e., by means of reason(ing) and scripture. And the proper nature of entities has been ascertained (*niścīta*) through reason(ing) and scripture as consisting ultimately of mere non-origination.²⁹

1.2.3. As we can see, the pre-6th-century paradigm of *yukti* and *āgama* (1) does not contrast their material jurisdictions and has them contributing equally and co-extensively to doctrinal elaboration and proof procedures; (2) it does not appoint *yukti* as a means of evaluating scripture, but takes it as an hermeneutic device subservient to the *yogin's* personal endeavour along the Buddhist path; (3) it does not consider the non-Buddhist scriptures, neglects apologetics on behalf of Buddhism as a whole and remains subordinate to purely inter-sectarian, intra-Buddhistic polemics. In sharp contradistinction to this, Dharmakīrti (and the remark is likely to apply to Dignāga also) clearly distinguished between the material jurisdictions of reason(ing) and scripture. He granted full epistemic autonomy to reason(ing) in the empirical sphere and concomitant-

²⁸ BhK 1.508/198,11–16.

²⁹ BhK 1.508/198,21–509/199,2: *cintāmayyā prajñayā yuktyāgamābhyāṃ pratyavekṣya bhūtam eva vasturūpaṃ bhāvanīyam / vastūnāṃ svarūpaṃ ca paramārthato 'nutpāda evāgamato yuktitaś ca niścitam /*.

ly restricted the legitimate scope of scripture to the supersensible realm. The authority of scripture was now dependent on reason(ing) via a set of evaluative criteria.³⁰ But one of the most decisive features of Dharmakīrti's model consists in its dismissal of any attempt at deriving scriptural authority from (claims to) personal authority or charisma (as, e.g., the Naiyāyikas, the Jainas, but also many of his co-religionists were inclined to do). Scriptural authority must now be sought in *texts* and according to the criterion of *yukti* alone.

1.3.1. Let me concentrate now on Dharmakīrti's dismissal of personal authority as a criterion of scriptural authority and the concomitant subjection of scripture to reason(ing). As is well known, the Buddha entered *parinirvāṇa* without appointing any of his disciples as the head of the order. He also did not provide the latter with a hierarchy, nor did he leave a body of authoritative scriptures. Asked by Vassakāra (a minister of King Ajātasattu) about the persistent unity of the order, however, Ānanda answered that the fully enlightened one had not left the *saṅgha* without a refuge (*pratisaraṇa*), since the latter had the *dharma* for its refuge.³¹ But as Buddhist missionary activity spread all over India and communities were founded in remote areas, gradually evolving their own disciplinary and doctrinal specificities, an increasing need was felt for criteria enabling the Buddhists to authenticate the teachings they encountered in various places. This circumstance was instrumental in the development of the set of (two or) three authenticating criteria that are found scattered throughout the various recensions of the so-called *Mahāpadeśasūtra*, "The Scripture on the [four] references to authority."³² As R. Davidson has it, "[f]our specific situations were designated as normative in the transmission of the *dharma*."³³ According to

³⁰ See below, §1.4.

³¹ See Lamotte 1947: 213, Dutt 1962: 70–72, Davidson 1990: 302.

³² See Lamotte 1947, Davidson 1990: 297–303 and, for references, Lamotte 1947: 219–220.

³³ Davidson 1990: 300.

this source, a monk might be inclined to admit as authentic a teaching heard from

“1. the mouth of the Buddha, 2. a [s]aṃgha of elders, 3. a group of bhikṣus who were [a] specialists in the *dharmā* (*dharmadhara*), [b] specialists in the *vinaya* (*vinayadhara*), or [c] specialists in the proto-*abhidharma* lists (*mātrkādhara*), or, 4. a single bhikṣu who was such a specialist.”³⁴

But according to the Buddha, or at least his literary representatives, this would simply amount to granting an individual or a community authority, and this was something he was not ready to allow. Upon hearing a teaching from the mouth of these individuals, a monk should rather decide whether this teaching occurs in the *sūtra* (*sūtre vatarati*), “is reflected in the *vinaya*, and does not contradict reality (*dharmatā*)” (*vinaye samdrśyate dharmatāṃ ca na vilomayati*).³⁵ In other words, an individual cannot be granted authority unless his words have been proven to stand this threefold analysis, i.e., to match *dharmā*.

1.3.2. However, in the definitive absence of the Buddha, the Buddhist communities not only faced the problem of authenticity (or: external criticism), but also had to address the issue of interpretation (or: internal criticism).³⁶ This development may have taken place a few centuries later: While it cannot be traced in the Pāli *nikāyas* (but only in the *Nettipakaraṇa*), it is abundantly reflected in Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika as well as Mādhyamika sources.³⁷ Specialists in scriptural exegesis and hermeneutics evolved a set of four criteria, called “[interpretative] refuges/bases” (*pratisaraṇa*), which were aimed at warding off personal charisma, literalism, mental confusion and excessive discursivity in the interpretation of the Buddhist law and its sources. This doctrine warns the monk and/or *bodhisattva* to rely 1. on *dharmā* and not on persons (*pudgala*), 2. on the meaning/spirit (*artha*) and not on the letter (*vyañjana*), 3. on *sūtras* of explicit mean-

³⁴ Davidson 1990: 300.

³⁵ Davidson 1990: 300.

³⁶ On the Buddhist critique of interpretation, see Lamotte 1949.

³⁷ For references, see Lamotte 1949: 342 and *Traité* I 536–540.

ing (*nītārtha*) and not on *sūtras* of intentional meaning (*neyārtha*), and 4. on insight (*jñāna*) and not on discursive knowledge (*viññāna*).³⁸ Of decisive importance in the present context is the first of these four principles, the injunction to take recourse in *dharma* rather than a person purporting to teach *dharma*. In my opinion, Dharmakīrti is endeavouring to reinstate this hermeneutic principle on a sound philosophical basis. But, as we have seen, Dharmakīrti contrasts *pudgala* with *yukti*, not with *dharma*. How did, then, the distinction between reason(ing) and scripture come about? In order to understand this, let me turn to an early Yogācāra interpretation and reworking of this fourfold interpretative pattern.

1.3.3. As the BoBh amply testifies, a number of Buddhist intellectuals of (proto-)idealist persuasion later merged this fourfold interpretative structure into the soteriological scheme of the three successive insights (*prajñā*). Not content with this innovation, they substituted *yukti* for *dharma* in the wording of the first principle. In so doing, they were true to the demands of the *cintāmayī prajñā*, which, as we have seen, resorts to four types of reason(ing). Note, however, that these thinkers did not, for all this, renounce the pattern of warning one to check a given teaching's conformity to *sūtra*, *vinaya*, and reality: the ambition to keep true to the *dharma* remained (as alluded to in the motif of "the harmful and the great references to authority" [*kālāpadeśamahāpadeśa*]),³⁹ but a strong emphasis on reason(ing)

³⁸ Note, e.g., AKVy 174,8–11 and 704,20–22: *catvārīmāni bhikṣavaḥ pratisaraṇāni / katamāni catvāri / dharmāḥ pratisaraṇaṃ na pudgalaḥ / arthaḥ pratisaraṇaṃ na vyañjanam / nītārthasūtraṃ pratisaraṇaṃ na neyārtham / jñānaṃ pratisaraṇaṃ na viññānam iti /*. "There are, O monks, four [interpretative] bases. Which four? The law is the [interpretative] basis, not the person. The meaning(/spirit) is the [interpretative] basis, not the letter. The *sūtra* of direct(/explicit) meaning is the [interpretative] basis, not [the *sūtra*] of indirect(/intentional) meaning. Insight is the [interpretative] basis, not discursive knowledge."

³⁹ BoBhVy D Yi 129a1–2/P Ri 157b12: *nag po bstan pa ni mdo sde la mi 'jug 'dul ba la mi snañ chos ñid dan' gal bar gnas pa'o // de las bzlog pa dkar po'i phyogs ni chen po bstan pa'o //*. "The black references to authority are points that do not occur in the *sūtras*, do not appear in the *vinaya* and contradict the fundamental nature [of things]. The white side, which is

as an investigative and, at least in part, autonomous principle was added to it. Let us consider a first excerpt from the BoBh:

How does a *bodhisattva* apply himself to the four [interpretative] bases? In this case, a *bodhisattva* looks for the [true] meaning rather than the [formal] perfection of the letter [when] he learns the law from someone else. [Therefore,] while learning the law in looking for the [true] meaning rather than the letter, that *bodhisattva* who relies on the [true] meaning respectfully learns the law even if it is taught in a vulgar(/vernacular) language (*vāc*). Moreover, a *bodhisattva* acquaints himself thoroughly with both the harmful and the great references to authority. While getting acquainted [with them], he relies on reason(ing) and not on the person [by thinking]: ‘These doctrinal items have been preached by an elder, or by a distinguished person, or by a(/the) Tathāgata, or by a(/the) community.’ While thus relying on reason(ing) rather than on the person, neither does he depart from the [true] reality nor does he depend on anyone else regarding the doctrinal items [which he subjects to reason(ing)]. ... To sum up, four [things] have been declared here as authoritative regarding these four [interpretative] bases: the [true] meaning [as it has been] preached, reason(ing), the Teacher, and the cultivational cognition [consisting in direct] realization. And all four [interpretative] bases display the unerring expertness of a *bodhisattva* who has undertaken true practice.⁴⁰

contrary to them, is [called] a great reference to authority” BoBhVṛ D 175b7–176a1/P Yi 221b2–3: *gañ mdo sde la ’jug ciñ ’dul ba la snañ la / chos ñid dañ mi ’gal ba de ni chen po bstan pa yin la / de las bzlog pa ni nag po bstan pa’o //*. “That which occurs in the *sūtras*, appears in the *Vinaya* and does not contradict the fundamental nature [of things] is [called] a great reference to authority. [That which is] contradictory to it is [called] a black reference to authority.” On *kālāpadeśa*, see La Vallée Poussin 1938: 158–160. Unfortunately, it seems that La Vallée Poussin was not aware of these passages and thus, was unable to determine the meaning of the expression.

⁴⁰ BoBh D175,14–176,7/W256,23–258,3: *kathaṃ bodhisattvaś caturṣu pratisaraṇeṣu prayujyate / iha bodhisattvo ’rthārthī⁽¹⁾ parato dharmam śṛṇoti na vyañjanābhisaṃskārārthī / so ’rthārthī dharmam śṛṇvan na vyañjanārthī prakṛtayāpi vācā dharmam deśyamānam arthapratīsarāṇo bodhisattvaḥ satkṛtya śṛṇoti / punar bodhisattvaḥ kālāpadeśaṃ ca mahāpadeśaṃ ca yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti / prajānan yuktipratīsarāṇo bhavati na sthavireṇābhijñātena vā pudgalena tathāgatena vā sañ-*

As we can see, the “older” concern for a given teaching’s conformity to *dharma* is now if not abandoned, at least split into two distinct things: first, the acquaintance with the so-called “black” and “great” references to authority, i.e., one’s ability to distinguish between teachings that conform to *sūtra*, *vinaya* and reality, and those that do not; second, and more importantly, reason(ing), which ensures that the reflecting *bodhisattva* does not lapse from true reality, a statement that parallels the ŚrBh’s strong insistence on the fact that reason(ing) closely mirrors reality itself (or, at least, mundane conventional reality). This concern with reason(ing) as an autonomous investigative principle is further strengthened by our text’s final statement concerning the four authoritative elements successively involved in the process: at its proper level and in its jurisdiction, reason(ing) is fully authoritative and, when interpreting the law, must be resorted to instead of the person.

1.3.4. The BoBh has more to offer in this connection. In another passage pertaining to the four interpretative bases, the BoBh draws a sharp delineation between reason(ing) and faithful conviction (*adhimukti*), i.e., between the jurisdictions of autonomous reason(ing) on one hand, and belief in the inconceivable things preached by the Buddha on the other:

What does the correct reflection of a *bodhisattva* consist of? In this case, eager to reflect upon, to ponder and to investigate the doctrinal items as [he has previously] learnt them, the *bodhisattva* [remains] solitary, retreats to a lonely place and sets about reflecting upon [these] doctrinal items, avoiding the inconceivable points from the very beginning. He reflects on [them] extensively with a perseverant and zealous application, not carelessly. The *bodhisattva* who applies himself to reflection examines [and] penetrates certain [points] by [means of] reason(ing),

ghena veme dharmā bhāṣitā iti pudgalapratīsarāṇo bhavati / sa evaṃ yuktipratīsarāṇo na pudgalapratīsarāṇas tattvārthān na vicalaty aparapratyayaś ca bhavati dharmeṣu / ... tatraiṣu caturṣu pratīsarāṇeṣu samāsataś caturṇāṃ prāmānyaṃ samprakāśitam⁽²⁾ / bhāṣitasyārthasya yukteḥ śāstur bhāvanāmayasya cādhigamajñānasya / sarvaiś ca punaś caturbhiḥ pratīsarāṇaiḥ samyakprayogasamārambhagatasya bodhisattvasyāvibhrāntaniryāṇam abhidhyotitaṃ bhavati /.

⁽¹⁾Note Tib. *don ’dod pa’i phyir*; ⁽²⁾note Tib. *tshad ma ñid b’zi bstan te*.

[whereas] he just believes in certain [other points].⁴¹ While reflecting, he relies on the [true] meaning and not on the letter. He gets thoroughly acquainted with the harmful and the great references to authority and enters into reflection by entering [it] from the very beginning. [Once he has] entered [reflection], he strengthens [it] ever more by concentrating his mind. Leaving what is inconceivable⁴² aside, the *bodhisattva* does not lapse into confusion and mental distraction. While he applies himself persistently and zealously and reflects extensively, he discerns and attains a previously undiscerned meaning (*avijñātapūrva*) and neither ruins nor loses the meaning [newly] discerned and acquired. Moreover, when he discriminates, penetrates and examines certain [points] by [means of] reason(ing), he does not depend on anyone else regarding the doctrinal items that he is rationally analyzing. And when

⁴¹ I.e., according to BoBhVy D Yi 128b7/P Ri 157a8–b1, holds the Tathāgata to be an authority (**pramāṇabhūta*) regarding them.

⁴² As hinted at by *Sāgaramegha (BoBhVy D128b5/P157a5–6), these inconceivable points (*acintyasthāna*) have their *locus classicus* in the *Śrutamayībhūmi* of the VinSg. According to at least two passages in the YBh (see ŚrBh 117*,8–12/140,6–11 [ŚrBh_T D57a3–5/P67a8–b3] and VinSg D190a6–b1/P197b2–4), the inconceivable points amount to six: conception of a self (*ātmacintā*), conception of a living being (*sattvacintā*), conception of a worldly being (*lokacintā*), conception relating to the (result-of-)maturation of living beings' act(ion)s (*sattvānāṃ karmavipākacintā*), the object meditated upon by the meditators (< *dhyāyināṃ dhyāyiviṣayaḥ*), and the object that is proper to the *buddhas* (< *buddhānāṃ buddhaviṣayaḥ*). The VinSg draws a sharp delineation between *ātmacintā*, *sattvacintā* and *lokacintā* on the one hand, which are all based on the false view of a self (*satkāyadrṣṭi*, VinSg D190b5–6/P197b8), and *sattvānāṃ karmavipākacintā*, *dhyāyināṃ dhyāyiviṣayaḥ* and *buddhānāṃ buddhaviṣayaḥ*, which are free of the false view of a self. Next, the VinSg (D191a1–2/P198a4–5) gives a threefold content to the *dhyāyināṃ dhyāyiviṣayaḥ*, and a fivefold one to the *buddhānāṃ buddhaviṣayaḥ*: whereas the object meditated upon by the meditators consists of thusness alone (**tathatāmātra*), the supremacies (**vaśitā*) and the pure realm (**anāsravadhātu*), the object that is proper to the *buddhas* consists of these three plus two, viz. the absence of obstacles (**anāvāraṇa*) and action for the benefit of the living beings (**sattvārthakriyākāra*). For definitions of *acintya*, see MSU D277a4–5/P335a7–b1 (see Lamotte 1973: II 274) and BoBhVṛ D 'I 175b4–6/P Yi 221a5–8. On *acintya*, see also Kritzer 2002.

he [just] believes in certain [other points], he does not reject those profound doctrinal items which his intelligence does not fathom, [but just thinks] the following: ‘These doctrinal items are within the scope of the Tathāgata(s) [only], not within the scope of our intelligence;’ [in doing so,] he guards himself [and remains] uninjured, unimpaired and irreproachable. A *bodhisattva* who relies on the [true] meaning and not on the letter penetrates all the intentional sayings of the blessed *buddhas*. Nobody can cause a *bodhisattva* who is expert in the harmful and the great references to authority to turn away and deviate from true reality in any way. A *bodhisattva* who enters reflection from the beginning acquires a previously unacquired forbearance. Consolidating this forbearance, the *bodhisattva* enters [mental] cultivation.⁴³

Especially noteworthy is our text’s emphasis on the distinction between reason(ing) and belief/faithful conviction. Here, the *bodhisat-*

⁴³ BoBh D76,8–77,1/W108,2–109,5: *samyakcintanā bodhisattvasya katamā / iha bodhisattva ekākī rahogato yathāśrutān dharmāmś cintayitukāmas tulayitukāma upaparīkṣitukāma ādita evācintyāni sthānāni vivarjayitvā dharmāmś cintayitum ārabhate / pratataṃ ca cintayati sātatyasatkṛtyaprayogena na ślatham / kiṃcid ca bodhisattvaś cintāprayukto yuktyā vicārayaty anupraviśati / kiṃcid adhimucyata eva / arthapratīsaraṇaś ca bhavati cintayan na vyañjanapratīsaraṇaḥ / kālāpadeśamahāpadeśāmś ca yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti / ādipraveśena ca cintāṃ praviśati / praviśtaś ca punaḥ punar manasikārataḥ sārātāṃ upanayati / acintyaṃ varjayan bodhisattvaḥ sammohaṃ cittavikṣepaṃ nādhigacchati / pratataṃ sātatyasatkṛtyaprayuktaś cintayann avijñāta-pūrvāṃ cārthaṃ vijñāti labhate / vijñātaṃ ca pratilabdham arthaṃ na vināśayati na sampramoṣayati / yuktyā punaḥ kiṃcit pravacinvan praviśayan vicārayan na parapratyayo bhavati teṣu yuktiparīkṣiteṣu dharmeṣu / kiṃcit punar adhimucyamāno yeṣv asya dharmeṣu gambhīreṣu buddhir nāvagāhate⁽¹⁾ tathāgatagocarā ete dharmā nāsmadbuddhigocarā ity evam apratikṣipaṃs tān dharmān ātmānam akṣataṃ cānupahataṃ ca pariharaty anavadyam / arthaṃ pratīśaran bodhisattvo na vyañjanaṃ buddhānāṃ bhagavatāṃ sarvasandhāyavacanāny anupraviśati / kālāpadeśamahāpadeśakuśalo bodhisattvas tattvārthān na vicālayitum na vikampayitum kenacit kathaṃcic chakyate / āditaś cintāṃ anupraviśan bodhisattvo ’pratilabdhapūrvāṃ kṣāntiṃ pratilabhate / tām eva⁽²⁾ kṣāntiṃ sārātāṃ upanayan bodhisattvo bhāvanāṃ anupraviśati /*

⁽¹⁾BoBh_D: *na gāhate* BoBh_W; ⁽²⁾BoBh_D: *tām eva ca punaḥ supratilabdham* BoBh_W.

On (parts of) this passage, see also Nance 2007: 156 n. 29.

tva is summoned to resort to reason(ing) wherever the points he inquires into are not inconceivable, i.e., are not to be reflected upon. In so doing, he wards off confusion, mental distraction and remains unimpaired.

1.3.5. As we can see, the BoBh substituted *yukti* for *dharma* in the wording of the first interpretative principle and drew a sharp delineation between the legitimate scope of *yukti* and the realm of inconceivable things. While rationally reflecting on the items that he has learnt, the *bodhisattva* is warned to provisionally set the inconceivable items aside and to evaluate the reliability of the empirical ones. Beyond that, the BoBh strongly insists on the independent authority of reason(ing) in its own sphere and advises the *bodhisattva* not to rely on the person who has revealed the teachings under scrutiny. This is in line with two significant features of Dharmakīrti's views on *yukti* and *āgama*. Note, however, that the BoBh's account still fully belongs to the hermeneutic and soteriological pattern of the three insights and as such bears no relationship whatsoever to scriptural evaluation and apologetics.

1.3.6. Leaving the sociohistorical context aside, how is Dharmakīrti's decision to ground scriptural authority in texts rather than persons to be explained? In order to answer this question, we have to turn briefly to the 6th-century philosophical context. Dharmakīrti's main opponent, the Mīmāṃsaka philosopher Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa, had directed a devastating critique against the Buddhist notion of omniscience. Now, many of Dharmakīrti's Buddhist coreligionists overlooked this principle and surrendered to the personal authority of the omniscient Buddha. As even a superficial glance reveals, many Buddhist intellectuals at least partly infringed the injunction to carry out scriptural interpretation by relying on *dharma* or reason(ing) rather than *pudgala*, thus indulging in deriving scriptural authority from personal authority and especially from the *buddhas'* omniscience. For example, the *UH clearly relates scriptural knowledge to highly authoritative individuals such as elders, *buddhas* and *bodhisattvas*.⁴⁴ Commenting on the MAV (3.12b) and its *Bhāṣya* (42,10), Sthi-

⁴⁴ See *UH/*PS 14,6–8.

ramati provides the following definition: “Scripture consists of the word of trustworthy [persons]; as for trustworthy persons, they are free of [all] causes of untruth.”⁴⁵ No less characteristic are some definitions encountered in Mādhyamika literature, such as Candrakīrti’s statement to the effect that “the word of trustworthy [persons] cognizing supersensible things in a direct [perceptual] manner, this is scripture.”⁴⁶ To put it briefly, certain Buddhist intellectuals were inclined to derive the authority of scripture from the authority of individuals such as *buddhas*, *bodhisattvas*, and noble hearers. In doing so, they came dangerously close to the Naiyāyika formula according to which “the authority of the [Veda/trustworthy word comes] from the authority of the trustworthy [person who revealed it].”⁴⁷

1.3.7. As is well known, the Mīmāṃsā school of Vedic exegesis denied human beings or divinities any cognitive access to the supersensible realm to which the Vedic injunction refers. According to this school, and especially to Kumārila, the only authority regarding *dharma* is the authorless Veda. In order to make his point, Kumārila directed a devastating critique against omniscience. Let us consider here only the following argument:

For even in those days, how did people who desired to know that he is omniscient know [that he was so], without knowing the objects of his cognition? And, for you, there would be many omniscient beings to be postulated. One who is not omniscient [can]not know [that] an omniscient being [is indeed omniscient].⁴⁸

This criticism undermines all attempts at resorting to an omniscient *pudgala* in order to argue for the reliability of the Buddhist scriptures.

⁴⁵ MAVṬ 128,21: *āptavāg āgamaḥ / āptāḥ punar anṛtahetuvimuktāḥ /*.

⁴⁶ Pr 75,6–7: *sākṣādatīndriyārthavidām āptānām yad vacanaṃ sa āgamaḥ /*.

⁴⁷ NS 2.1.68: *tatprāmāṇyam āptaprāmāṇyāt*.

⁴⁸ ŚV *codanāsūtra* 134–135: *sarvajño ’sāviti hyetat tatkāle’pi bubhutsubhiḥ / tajjñānajñeyavijñānarahitair gamyate katham // kalpaniyās ca sarvajñā bhavayur bahavas tava / ya eva syād asarvajñāḥ sa sarvajñam na budhyate //*. Translation Kataoka 2011: II 362–364.

In my opinion, Dharmakīrti was so fully aware of the philosophical cogency of Kumāriḷa's argument that he even developed it further:

Others [i.e., we Buddhists] consider that it is difficult to know other [persons]' vices or even(/and also) [their] being [morally] immaculate [in judgements such as:] 'This [person] is so or not so,' because the *pramāṇas* [that could ascertain these mental properties] are[, to say the least,] difficult to be found. Indeed, it is due to [their] mental qualities and vices that human beings behave correctly and wrongly. Now, these [mental properties, being] supersensible [and therefore out of perceptual reach], might be inferable from the bodily and verbal actions they give rise to, but as a rule, [human] actions can also be done deliberately in an insincere way (*anyathā*), because they are a function of human arbitrariness, and because these [human beings] have [the most] various motivations. Therefore, failing to ascertain [another person's moral qualities] due to the confusion of the [inferential] mark, how could one [who intends to infer them] recognize [the author of a reliable scripture]?⁴⁹

In order to ground a certain scripture's reliability in its author's personal reliability, one ought to discern this person's mental qualities. But these are supersensible and hence not within the reach of ordinary perception; these mental properties are not inferable, for the verbal and corporeal behaviours supposed to manifest them can be made intentionally deceptive. One should, then, be endowed with *abhijñās* in order to gain access to these qualities, which is not the case of (most) ordinary persons. This is, I believe, the philosophical rationale behind Dharmakīrti's reaffirmation of the priority of *yukti* over *puḡgala*.

⁴⁹ PV 1.219 and PVSV 110,11–15: *ayam evaṃ na vety anyadoṣā nirdoṣatāpi vā / durlabhatvāt pramāṇānāṃ durbodhety apare viduḥ // caitasyebhyo hi guṇadoṣebhyaḥ puruṣāḥ samyamithyāpravṛttayaḥ / te cātīndriyāḥ svaprabhavakāyavāgvavahārānumeyāḥ syuḥ / vyavahārās ca prāyaśo buddhipūrvam anyathāpi kartuṃ śakyante puruṣecchāvṛttitvāt teṣāṃ ca citrābhisandhitvāt / tad ayaṃ liṅgasaṅkarāt katham aniścinvan pratipadyeta /*. To be compared with PVin 2 66,12–67,3 (see Steinkellner 1979: 65–66). On this passage, see Yaita 1988: 435, Dunne 2004: 367–368, Eltschinger 2007a: 92–96 and 229–230, McClintock 2010: 253–261. More generally, see Akimoto 1993.

1.4.0. Although Dharmakīrti readily accepts, as do all the Buddhist and most Indian religio-philosophical systems, that the authority of scripture can only proceed from an individual's cognitive and moral qualities, he strongly rejects as irrational any attempt at deriving scriptural authority from (alleged) personal authority. The only way out is therefore to evaluate the reliability of scriptures themselves. But here again, the cognitive limitations of ordinary persons prevent them from assessing those scriptural statements that bear on supersensible matters, the proper jurisdiction of scriptures. These persons are doomed to resort to reason(ing), i.e., to the two means of valid cognition which, though limited in scope, are practically reliable in the empirical sphere. In other words, a rational person qua rational will subject scriptures to critical test, i.e., assess their reliability on empirical matters. Should the treatise under examination stand critical evaluation in this respect, its reliability in transempirical matters also can be reasonably hypothesized. What rationality prescribes, then, is an inferential transfer of authority from one class of statements to another. It is clear that this way of concluding a treatise's authority concerning the supersensible realm is formally flawed, insofar as it is just as uncertain as to conclude that all the rice grains boiling in the same pot are cooked because the few grains one has tasted are cooked.⁵⁰ Provided the treatise under scrutiny teaches a human goal (*puruṣārthābhīdhāyin*) together with a suitable or practicable means (*anugūṇopāya*), and this in an internally coherent way (*sambaddha*), it is qualified (*adhikṛta*) for being evaluated as to its reliability.⁵¹ Dharmakīrti presents us with two alternative strategies. And although he seems not to favour one over the other, it is nearly certain that they served fairly distinct purposes, for if, in actual use, the first one suits "heresiological" purposes, the second one has an apologetic vocation.

1.4.1. Dharmakīrti presents the first evaluative strategy as follows:

The [treatise]'s reliability consists in the fact that neither perception nor the two kinds of inferences invalidates the empirical or transem-

⁵⁰ See PVSV 109,21–22 and 173,20–174,6.

⁵¹ See PV 1.214 and PVSV 108,6–16.

pirical things [that are] their [respective] objects. [A treatise's] not being invalidated by perception consists [first] in the fact that the things it holds to be perceptible are indeed such [i.e., perceptible], as [the five *skandhas*, i.e., colours] such as blue, [affective sensations such as] pleasure and pain, [ideation consisting in one's] grasping the characteristics [of things, conditioning factors] such as desire, and cognitions[, which are all perceived by sensory perception and self-awareness]. [Second, a treatise's not being invalidated by perception consists] in the fact that the [things] it does not hold to be such [i.e., perceptible,] are [indeed] imperceptible, as [pseudo-constituents] such as pleasure, which [the Sāṅkhya erroneously takes to] combine in the form of sounds, etc., and [categories] such as substances, motions, universals and connections[, which the Vaiśeṣika erroneously takes to be perceptible]. Similarly, [a treatise's not being invalidated by inference] consists [first] in the fact that the [things] it holds to be the objects of an inference that does not depend on scripture are really such [i.e., inferable], as the four nobles' truths, [and second] in the fact that the [things it holds to be] non-inferable are really such [i.e., non-inferable], like the self, [God,] etc. [And this type of invalidation is] also [relevant] concerning an inference that depends on scripture[, which consists in identifying internal contradictions within a treatise]: for example, once it is admitted that demerit has the nature of [defilements] such as desire and the [corporeal and verbal acts] that originate from them, one does not prescribe [things] such as ablutions and fire oblation in order to remove it [i.e., demerit, because they cannot annihilate its cause].⁵²

According to this method, a given treatise can be held to be authoritative, i.e., *āgama* proper, if its statements are not contradicted by, or

⁵² PV 1.215 and PVSV 108,20–109,3: *pratyakṣeṇānumānena dvididhenāpy abādhanam / dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthayor asyāvisaṃvādas tadarthayoḥ // pratyakṣeṇābādhanam pratyakṣābhimatānām arthānām tathābhāvaḥ / yathā nīlādisukhaduḥkhanimittopalakṣaṇarāgādibuddhinām / atathābhimatānām cāpratyakṣatā / yathā śabdādirūpasamṇiveśinām sukhādīnām dravyakarmasāmānyasamṇyogādīnām ca / tathānāgamāpekṣānumānaviṣayābhimatānām tathābhāvaḥ / yathā caturṇām āryasatyānām / ananumeyānām tathābhāvaḥ / yathātmādīnām / āgamāpekṣānumāne `pi yathā rāgādirūpaṃ tatprabhavaṃ cādharmaṃ abhyupagamyā tatprahāṇāya snānāgnihoṭrāder anupadeśaḥ /*. On this passage, see Yaita 1987: 7–8, Dunne 2004: 362–363, Eltschinger 2007a: 105–109 and 221–223 (especially nn. 23–27), and Moriyama 2013.

do not contradict the means of valid cognition. This way of characterizing scripture echoes early Yogācāra statements and definitions. Having provided definitions of perception and inference, the AS presents the scripture of a trustworthy person as a teaching (*upadeśa*) that is not contradicted by the first two (*tadubhayāviruddha*), i.e., perception and inference.⁵³ Among the many adjectives describing the perfection of the Buddha's teaching (*deśanāsampatti*) in MSA 12.5–6, one comes across *yukta*, "sound, correct," which Vasubandhu explains as "because it is not contradicted by the *pramāṇas*," a pattern that occurs again in connection with the sixty members (*aṅga*, MSA 12.9) of this teaching's phonemes/letters (*vyañjana*), i.e., the infinite voice of the *sugatas*.⁵⁴ And among the many reasons accounting for the perfection of the phonemes/letters (*vyañjanasampatti*), one finds *uddeśāt*, "because of [its] statement," upon which Vasubandhu comments: "Because it is stated with words and phonemes that are correct because they are not contradicted by the *pramāṇas*."⁵⁵ As we can see, the Buddhist teaching's correctness is due to its conformity to the means of valid cognition. As for the issue of *pramāṇavirodha*, it is addressed in Vasubandhu's influential VY, a treatise on the methodology of scriptural commentary. Having listed the three means of valid cognition and stated that a contradiction with any of them amounts to a contradiction with reason(ing) (**yuktivirodha*),⁵⁶ Vasubandhu discusses several examples of contradiction with perception (**pratyakṣavirodha*), inference (**anumānavirodha*) and scripture (**āgamavirodha*).⁵⁷ Once again, these definitions and strategies were certainly not meant to apply to non-Buddhist scriptures. And, al-

⁵³ ASBh 153,5: *āptāgamas tadubhayāviruddhopadeśaḥ* /. For the AS's definitions of perception and inference, see ASBh 152,27 (Schmithausen 1972: 161) and ASBh 153,1–4 (Prets 1994: 348) respectively.

⁵⁴ MSABh 78,16–17 and 80,15–16: *yuktā pramāṇāviruddhatvāt* /.

⁵⁵ MSABh 79,8: *yuktaiḥ padavyañjanair uddeśāt pramāṇāvirodhena* /.

⁵⁶ See VY P102b6–7/L173,16–19. On the VY as a possible source of the epistemologists' *pariḥātraya*, see Verhagen 2008, which also provides an edition of the passage dedicated to *pramāṇavirodha*.

⁵⁷ See VY P102b7–103a3/L174,1–13, VY P103a3–6/L174,14–175,10, VY P103a8–104a4/L175,11–177,18.

though both the MSA(Bh) and the VY are clearly apologetic in nature, what they promote and defend is never Buddhism from outsiders, but Mahāyāna from Hīnayāna/Śrāvakayāna. Now Dharmakīrti's first evaluative strategy, though it is clearly supposed to apply successfully to the Buddhist scriptures (as Dharmakīrti's way of presenting it testifies), seems to have been intended as a polemical, "heresiological" device, as its application to the Veda strongly suggests:

"[The Veda] says that a permanent soul is the agent [of action], [indeed] that there are permanent entities, [and] that supersensible [things] are sensible. [It declares] a wrong cause, a wrong duration as well as a [wrong] cessation of entities, or [puts forward yet] other [things] whose possibility (*gocara*) is excluded by the two means of valid cognition or contradicted by inference based on scripture. He who would pretend that [such a treatise] is veracious without having set aside [its] contradictions and without exhibiting the purpose of the treatise, would surpass an unchaste woman in audacity."⁵⁸

1.4.2. Dharmakīrti seems to have subsumed his properly apologetic concerns under a second strategy that he is likely to have adapted from Āryadeva's CŚ (and/or Dharmapāla's commentary thereon):⁵⁹

Or, because the true nature of what is to be eliminated and what is to be realized, together with [their respective] means, is ascertained (*prasiḍdhi*) [by means of a *pramāṇa* based on the force of something real], the [treatise's] principal point is reliable. Therefore [even when it bears] on another[, transempirical matter, the cognition derived from this treatise]

⁵⁸ PV 1.332–334: *nityasya puṃsaḥ karṭṛtvaṃ nityān bhāvān atīndriyān / aindriyān viṣamaṃ hetuṃ bhāvānāṃ viṣamāṃ sthitim // nivṛtṭim ca pramāṇābhyām anyad vā vyastagocaram / viruddham āgamāpekṣeṇānumānena vā vadat // virodham asamādhāya śāstrārthaṃ cāpradarśya saḥ / satyārthaṃ pratijānāno jayed dhārṣṭyena bandhakīm //*. Translation Eltschinger et al. 2012, p. 65. For a parallel passage, see TS_K 2775/TS_ṣ 2774 and TSP_K 766,4–19/TSP_ṣ 892,13–893,10.

⁵⁹ CŚ 280: **buddhokteṣu parokṣeṣu jāyate yasya saṃśayaḥ / ihaiva pratyayas tena kartavyaḥ sūnyatām prati //*. "When someone gives rise to doubt concerning the obscure [things] (*parokṣa*) taught by the Buddha, then he can rely on the voidness which is free of all [defining] characters, and [can thus] gain sure faith." Translation Tillemans 1986: 46 n. 21/1990: I 91 and II 132 (from the Chinese of T1571, 216c22–23).

tise is] an inference.⁶⁰ The reliability [of this treatise] consists in the fact that what is to be eliminated, what is to be realized, as well as their [respective] means as [they are] taught in it are non-belying [when they are submitted to inferential analysis], as the four nobles' truths [when they are analyzed] according to the method that will be presented [in the second chapter]. And since all that which serves a human goal and is [therefore] worthy of endeavour is reliable, to admit that it is such [i.e., reliable,] on another[, transempirical] matter also, [can]not be deceiving[, and this for two reasons: first,] because there [can] be no damage [in accepting it,] and [second,] because the speaker[, after having said what is true concerning the principal point,] has no [personal] interest in purposelessly speaking untruth [concerning this third kind of objects].⁶¹

As Dharmakīrti himself says, this is the method according to which he will establish the reliability of the Buddhist scriptures on the basis of a critical analysis of the four nobles' truths, their principal point. The proof covers about one half of PV 2 (i.e., PV 2.145–279), that part of the chapter in which Dharmakīrti comments on Dignāga's characterization of the Buddha as a "protector" (*tāyin*) of suffering living beings.⁶² Note that in PV 2 as in the PVSV, Dharmakīrti grounds the

⁶⁰ Or: "one [can] infer [that it is also reliable] on another[, transempirical matter]."

⁶¹ PV 1.217 and PVSV 109,15–19: *heyopādeyatattvasya sopāyasya prasiddhitāḥ / pradhānārthāvisaṃvādād anumānaṃ paratra vā // heyopādeyatadupāyānāṃ tadupadiṣṭānām avaiṣṭāyāṃ avisaṃvādaḥ / yathā caturṇām āryasatyānāṃ vakṣyamāṇanītyā / tasyāsyā puruṣārthopayogino 'bhiyogārhasyāvisaṃvādād viṣayāntare 'pi tathātvopagamo na vipralambhāyānuparodhān niṣprayojanavitathābhīdhānavaiṣṭāyā ca vaktuḥ /*. On this passage, see Tillemans 1986, Yaita 1987: 9–10, Dunne 2004: 365–366, Eltschinger 2007a: 225–227 and Krasser 2012; on the interpretation of *anuparodhāt*, see Eltschinger 2007a: 226 n. 45.

⁶² This section of PV 2 begins as follows: PV 2.145–146ab: *tāyaḥ svadrṣṭamārgoktir vaiphalyād vakti nānṛtam / dayālutvāt parārtham ca sarvārambhābhiyogataḥ // tataḥ pramāṇam tāyo vā catuḥsatyaprakāśanam /*. "[For the Sugata,] to protect [the living beings] is to teach [them] the path [as] he has experienced it. He does not speak untruth [i.e., does not teach a wrong path,] because, since he is compassionate and has applied himself to all [these] undertakings [just] for other peoples' sake,

transference of authority in the Buddha's alleged lack of interest in leading the living beings astray on the soteriologically less relevant domain, the transempirical one.

1.4.3. As we have seen, the Buddhist epistemologists turned earlier, mainly Yogācāra hermeneutic devices into apologetic tools. This is certainly not to say that properly evaluative rationality was an innovation of 6th-century philosophers for, though it is surprisingly rarely mirrored in the texts that have come down to us, this might have been a self-assertive strategy from the early times of Buddhism. This is reflected in an oft-quoted stanza ascribed to the Buddha himself, although the stanza's earliest attestation might be in Aśvaghoṣa's BC.⁶³ This well-known stanza runs as follows:

“Clever people, O monks, should accept what I say after putting it to the test, just as they accept gold after testing it by melting it, scratching it and scraping it on a whetstone. They should not believe what I say out of deference to me.”⁶⁴

As we can see, this stanza pertains to the word of the Buddha alone, and settles the ideal relationship between a Buddhist and the Buddhist scriptures as one of critical evaluation rather than blind adhesion. This stanza came to be regularly resorted to by the Buddhist epistemologists. Interestingly enough, they read their own religio-philosophical agenda into it, so that the stanza became the motto

[he has] no interest [in lying]. Therefore, he is a *pramāṇa*. Or, to protect is to reveal the four [nobles'] truths.”

⁶³ TSP_K 878,12/TSP_§ 1063,18: *ata eva viśuddhasuvarṇavat parīkṣya grāhyam etad vicakṣaṇair iti bhagavatoktam ...* “This is the reason why the Blessed One has declared: ‘Like pure gold, this [word of mine] should be adopted by the wise after examining it.’” BC 25.45 (Honjo 1993: 484[/63]): *bdar las gcad las bsregs pa las // mkhas pa rnam kyis gser bzin du // 'dul ba mdo las rigs pa las // de phyir yoṅs su rtog par rigs //*. This attitude towards authority is especially prominent in the *Kālāmasutta* (AN I 188–193). Most sincere thanks are due to René van Oosterwijk (The Hague) for this reference.

⁶⁴ TS_K 3588/TS_§ 3587 = NBPS 1.2.1: *tāpāc chedāc ca nikaṣāt suvarṇam iva paṇḍitaiḥ / parīkṣya bhikṣavo grāhyaṃ madvaco na tu gauravāt //*. Translation Hayes 1984: 664.

of evaluative rationality in a pluralistic context. This is already the case of the 6th-century Mādhyamika philosopher Bhāviveka (though in the context of a likely objection):

[When] certain ignorant [persons] think of a glass jewel (**kācamaṇi*) as being a genuine jewel (**ratna*) and [this glass jewel is but] a pseudo-jewel (**ratnābhāsa*), [some expert] points out that it is [but a] glass [jewel] because it does not resist [tests] such as being melted (**tāpa*) or being scraped on a whetstone (**nikaṣa*). In the same way, one is not justified (**ayukta*) in concluding that this [or that treatise] is an [authoritative] scripture (**āgama*) when it is established in this way [i.e., without any preliminary test]. On the contrary, this [alone] is [to be considered as authoritative] scripture (**āgama*) which does not undergo any alteration (**vikriyā*) [when it is critically examined], like genuine gold that resists [the tests of] being melted and being scraped on a whetstone.⁶⁵

The reinterpretation of the stanza along the lines of Dharmakīrti's threefold examination occurs in Kamalaśīla's NBPS:

“There are three types of objects: (1) that which can be experienced directly, (2) that which is presently beyond the range of the senses, and (3) that which is ultrasensible in principle. Among those types of objects, whatever the Buddha discusses that can be experienced directly should be tested by direct experience, as gold is tested by melting. Whatever the Buddha discusses that is presently beyond the range of the senses should be tested by inference, as gold is tested by scraping it on a whetstone. Whatever the Buddha discusses that is ultrasensible should be tested for its internal consistency. For the trustworthy experts established the scriptures, which are free from such contaminations [as logical inconsistencies], as credible sources of knowledge, despite the fact that scriptures deal with ultrasensible things.”⁶⁶

⁶⁵ TJ D279a7–b1/P315b5–7: *ji ltar mi mkhas pa 'ga' zig nor bu 'chiñ⁽¹⁾ bu la / yañ dag pa'i rin po che yin no sñam du sems pa la / de ni rin po che ltar snañ ba yin te⁽²⁾ / bsreg pa dañ bdar ba la sogs pa mi bzod pa'i phyir / 'chiñ⁽³⁾ bu yin no zes bstan pa bzin zes bsgrubs na de ñid yañ luñ yin no zes sgrub par byed ciñ rtog pa ni rigs pa ma yin gyi / yañ gañ zig bsreg pa dañ bdar ba bzod pa'i gser bzañ po bzin du rnam par 'gyur ba med pa de ni luñ yin no //.*

⁽¹⁾P : *mchiñ D*; ⁽²⁾P : *no D*; ⁽³⁾em. : *mchiñ D, 'chi P*.

⁶⁶ NBPS 1.2.1: *'di ltar don ni rnam pa gsum ste, mñon sum dañ, lkog tu gyur*

With its allusion to a threefold way of testing gold, the (pseudo-) canonical stanza lent itself to being interpreted along the lines of Dharmakīrti's first strategy. In doing so, the Buddhist epistemologists once again turned a purely intra-Buddhistic device into an apologetic and heresiological one. This "recontextualization" of the stanza finds its best expression in a few verses of Śāntarakṣita:

And the [omniscience that has been] established (*iṣṭa*, gl. *siddha*, Tib. 'grub) [here] is [that] of the Sugata [alone], because [it is he who] first (*ādau*) promulgated selflessness. Therefore the Tathāgata stands at the head of all the religious founders (*tīrthakṛt*). [In that they are] teaching contradictory things, the other [prophets are] not [to be applied] the same reason⁶⁷ as this [Tathāgata] who possesses a perception of true reality that is [entirely] consistent with the means of valid cognition. [And] indeed, these are far from possessing the capacity to cognize imperceptible [things] whose speech is undermined (*ākula*, Tib. *dkrugs*) by invalidation through the means of valid cognition [even] regarding the domain of the [ordinary] means of valid cognition. [Contrary to these, the teaching of the Sugata] is [internally] coherent, provided with a practicable (*anugūṇa*) means, and it sets forth a human goal [such as *nirvāṇa*]; even in empirical matters it is not invalidated in the least by the two means of valid cognition, [and is] like pure gold (*kaladhauta*, gl.

pa dañ, śin tu lkog tu gyur pa'o. de la bka'i don mñon sum la ni bsregs pas gser b'zin du mñon sum gyis brtags pa yin no. don lkog tu gyur pa la ni bdar ba b'zin du rjes su dpag pas brtags pa yin no. de ñid kyi don śin tu lkog tu gyur pa la ni bcad pas gser b'zin du phan tshun mi 'gal ba'i sgo nas brtags pa yin te, de ltar yoñs su dag pa'i luñ la ni yul lkog tu gyur kyañ, rtog pa dañ ldan pa tshad ma yin par yid ches pa rnams 'jug pa'i phyir ro. Translation Hayes 1984: 664.

⁶⁷ TSP_K 877,17–19/TSP_S 1062,16–18: *na hy eṣāṃ jñānātīśayayogitāprasādhakaḥ kaścīd dhetur asti / tathā hi hetur bhavad vacanākhyam eva liṅgaṃ bhavet / tac caiṣāṃ pramāṇaviruddhārthapratipādakam iti katham tato jñānātīśayayogitāmīṣāṃ pratiyeta /* "For there is no [logical] reason which establishes that these [other religious founders] are possessed with a superior cognition. Indeed, if there were a [logical] reason, it could only consist in the reason called 'statements' (*vacana*). Now, their [statements] teach things that are contradictory to (/contradicted by) the means of valid cognition. Therefore, how can one know from these [statements] that these [other religious founders] are possessed with a superior cognition?"

suvarṇa, Tib. *gser*) that does not undergo any alteration when one puts it to the test by melting it, scratching it or scraping it on a whetstone.⁶⁸

Here, the old stanza has been entirely recast according to Dharmakīrti's evaluation methods and now perfectly suits the Buddhist epistemologists' apologetic agenda in a pluralistic and competing religious environment.

1.5. In my opinion, two distinct but ultimately connected⁶⁹ factors are likely to explain this twofold shift towards evaluation and the rational appraisal of scriptural texts. The first one is, say, "internal" or philosophical and consists in Kumābila's devastating critique of omniscience and personal authority, which made earlier Buddhist attempts to ground scriptural authority in omniscience irrelevant. The second one is "external" or non-philosophical and consists in the sociohistorical context that was responsible for overt religious hostility between Buddhist and non-Buddhist denominations and the concomitant rise of philosophical disputation. This context made the search for cross-denominational evaluative criteria necessary and saw the sudden rise of competing and mutually exclusive claims to rationality. This historical matrix generated a dramatic change in the intended audience and overall meaning of Buddhist scholastic discourse during the 6th century. It led one or two generations of Buddhist intellectuals to turn a theretofore purely intra-Buddhistic scholasticism towards apologetics on behalf of Buddhism as a whole: first, as "heresiology," i.e., the critique of the non-Buddhist religio-philosophical tenets for allegedly conflicting with reason(ing), and

⁶⁸ TS_K 3340–3344/TS_S 3339–3343 (TS_T Ze D121b6–122a2): *etac ca sugatasyeṣṭam ādau nairātmyakīrtanāt / sarvatīrthakṛtām tasmāt sthito mūrdhni tathāgataḥ // tena pramāṇasaṃvāditattvadarśanayoginā / na tulyahetutānyeṣām viruddhārthopadeśinām // pramāṇagocare⁽¹⁾ yeṣām pramābādhākulaṃ vacaḥ / teṣām atyakṣavijñānaśaktiyogo hi dūrataḥ // sambaddhānuguṇopāyaṃ puruṣārthābhīdhāyakam / dṛṣṭe 'py arthe pramāṇābhyām iṣad apy aprabādhitam // tāpāc chedān nikaṣād vā kaladhautam ivāmalam / parīkṣyamāṇaṃ yan naiva vikriyāṃ pratipadyate //*

⁽¹⁾°gocare em. < Tib. (*spyod yul la*) : °gocarā Eds.

⁶⁹ See Eltschinger 2010a.

second, as apologetics proper, i.e., the positive defence of Buddhism as the only rational path to salvation. These two factors are, in my opinion, fully responsible for this shift towards a new “epistemic” configuration, so that incrementalist or developmental accounts of it should be excluded. This being said, it is no less certain that at least some of the elements composing this new matrix can be traced in earlier Yogācāra literature. This is the case of the delineation between the jurisdictions of reason(ing) and scripture (BoBh), of the foundation of scriptural authority in texts rather than persons (BoBh), of several definitions of scripture resorting to non-contradiction with the means of valid cognition (AS, MSA, VY), and even of the critical nature of reason(ing) – reason(ing) being the necessary counterpart of scripture. Both Kumārila’s critique and the sociohistorical matrix (without which Kumārila’s work itself would be inconceivable) are responsible for the *coalescence* of these elements around an entirely new apologetic concern and paradigm of rationality.

2. Practical rationality

2.1. For the Buddhist epistemologists, scriptural evaluation is but one part of a much broader concern with rationality as embodied in the character of the practically rational (*prekṣāvāt*) person, also known as the one who acts rationally (*prekṣāpūrvakārin*) or “rational agent.”⁷⁰ As S. McClintock has shown, the “judicious person”

⁷⁰ Despite its admittedly many connotations, I feel no reluctance at all to use the expression “(practical) rationality” for Skt. *prekṣāvattva/prekṣāpūrvakāritva*. As found in Webster’s dictionary (col. 1885b), “RATIONAL usu[ally] implies a latent or active power to make logical inferences and draw conclusions that enable one to understand the world about him and relate such knowledge to the attainment of ends ...” My use of “practical rationality” is independent of any commitment to a historically given definition of “reason,” but rather loosely echoes the modern concept of “instrumental/purposive rationality” (or: “means-end-rationality”). I am well aware of the fact that Max Weber developed such a concept as a “Schlüsselbegriff ... seiner Theorie des abendländischen Rationalisierungsprozesses” (HWP XII 1511 s.v. “Zweckrationalität”).

forms the ideal audience of works such as the TS(P), a remark that can certainly be extended to most of the epistemological treatises, including those of Dharmakīrti.⁷¹ In S. McClintock's characterization, the practically rational person "represents a standard of rationality," someone who "respects a version of the laws of contradiction and the excluded middle"⁷² and only applies "the conventions 'true' or 'untrue' when there exists a *pramāṇa* that respectively establishes or disproves the affair in question."⁷³ But as McClintock rightly points out,

"adherence to basic logical intuitions is just one facet of the judicious person. An element of practical reason is also involved, since a judicious person is invariably depicted as a person whose actions are directed toward some purpose or goal. In addition, ... a judicious person does not act toward some goal in a haphazard or whimsical manner, but proceeds only upon completing a suitable investigation into the means for attaining his goal."⁷⁴

Consequently, this person "avoids wasting time in investigating useless things," as a lustful woman doesn't "bother to investigate whether a eunuch is beautiful or ugly."⁷⁵ Most importantly, a judi-

⁷¹ The *prekṣāvat/prekṣāpūrvakārin* is the "ideal addressee" (McClintock 2010: 58) of the TS(P), which "can thus be seen as a guide for judicious persons who wish to undertake an examination of the rationality of Buddhist doctrines, and not *only* as a polemical work addressed at those who get it wrong" (McClintock 2010: 61). He "represents a standard of rationality to which Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla appeal regularly in the defense and promotion of their religious philosophy" (McClintock 2010: 58). To the best of my knowledge, Dignāga doesn't make use of either expression.

⁷² McClintock 2010: 58.

⁷³ McClintock 2010: 60.

⁷⁴ McClintock 2010: 58–59.

⁷⁵ McClintock 2010: 59. The second quotation is from S. McClintock's translation (2010: 59–60 n. 137) of PV 1.211: *arthakriyāsamarthasya vicāraiḥ kiṃ tadarthinām / śaṅḍhasya rūpavairūpye kāmīnyāḥ kiṃ parīkṣayā //*. "Why would those who seek the [thing in question] bother to analyze something that lacks causal efficacy? Why would a lustful

cious person is “anti-dogmatic, in that he or she will necessarily accept *any* position that is established through reasoning (*nyāya*), even if that position does not accord with the dogmas of the community in which he or she stands.”⁷⁶ A passage from the TSP is worth citing in this connection:

“If this thing were reasonable, then why would the Buddhist not accept it? For it is not correct for a judicious person not to accept a thing that has been proved through reasoning.”⁷⁷

There can be little doubt that the Buddhists’ rational agent is but one case of the 6th- to 8th-century philosophers’ repeated appeals to rationality as a criterion for the appraisal of their doctrines and the acceptance of their *pro domo* arguments.⁷⁸ But contrary to most of their opponents, the Buddhist epistemologists are to be credited with the development of a systematic concept of practical rationality that provides their apologetic discourse with fully worked out theoretical foundations.⁷⁹

2.2. Let us briefly turn back to scriptural evaluation in order to see how it relates to practical rationality. Maybe first among the Indian philosophers, Dharmakīrti grounded the issues of scriptural authority and scripturally based action in an *anthropological* perspective, a demarche which, as Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin make clear, he ascribes to Dignāga himself:

The teacher [Dignāga] did not say that scripture is an inference with reference (*kathayatā*) to any real authority(/epistemic validity) [i.e.,

woman bother to investigate whether a eunuch is beautiful or ugly?”

⁷⁶ McClintock 2010: 60.

⁷⁷ TSP_K 740,18–19/TSP_S 897,21–23: *yady ayam artho yuktyupetaḥ syāt / tadā kim iti bauddho nābhyupagacchet / na hi nyāyopapanne ’rthe prekṣāvato ’nabhyugagamo yuktaḥ /*. Translation McClintock 2010: 60 n. 140 (slightly modified).

⁷⁸ See above, n. 18.

⁷⁹ See Eltschinger 2007b, with which the second section of this essay partly overlaps.

to scripture as a genuine means of valid cognition], but with reference (*apekṣya*) to [the requirements of] human practice.⁸⁰

In other words, scripture does not meet the requirements of epistemic validity (*prāmāṇya*) but nevertheless represents, for the cognitively limited ordinary persons (*arvāgdarśin*, *prākṛtapuruṣa*, *rathyāpuruṣa*, etc.), the *only* way to interact with the supersensible realm of morals, ritual and eschatology:

The person [who wishes to engage in religious practice] cannot live without resorting to scriptural authority[, and this for two reasons: first,] because [it is only in scripture that this person] learns (*śravaṇa*) the great benefits and evils [that are to be expected from] engaging in and refraining from certain [actions/intentions] whose results [remain entirely] imperceptible [to him/her; and second,] because [this person] doesn't see [anything] contradictory to the existence of these [desirable or undesirable results]. Thus if [this person] is [necessarily] to act [on a scriptural basis], it is better that (s)he act in this way [i.e., after evaluating scripture, and] this is the reason why [Dignāga recommends that scriptural] authority [be decided] through [critical] evaluation.⁸¹

The close association between scriptural evaluation and practical rationality is made clear in the following statement:

[If] (s)he acts rationally and not out of [blind] adhesion, every [person] who wishes to engage [in religious practice] examines [whether a certain treatise is] scripture or not scripture[, thinking:] 'I may in all probability be successful if I act after learning (*jñātvā*) from this [scripture] what is to be realized.' [And] based on [this treatise's proven] reliability on [empirically] ascertainable (*śakyadarśana*) [matters], this [person will] act towards other[, transempirical things] also, for ordinary practice mainly proceeds in this way. But if one were to act by [first]

⁸⁰ PVT Je D242b5–6/P286a2–3 = PVSVT 390,21–22: *nācāryeṇa bhāvikaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ kathayatānumānatvam āgamasyoktam api tu puruṣapra-vṛttim apekṣya...*

⁸¹ PVSV 108,2–6: *nāyaṃ puruṣo 'nāśrityāgamaprāmāṇyam āsitum samarthaḥ / atyakṣaphalānāṃ keśāṃcit pravṛttinivṛttyor mahānuśamsāpāya⁽¹⁾ śravaṇāt tadbhāve virodhādarśanāc ca / tat sati pravartitavye varam evaṃ pravṛtta iti parīkṣayā prāmāṇyam /.*

⁽¹⁾em.: *mahānuśamsāpāpa*° Ed.

evaluating the person [who has authored the scripture rather than the scripture itself], there would simply be no practice at all. [That there would be no practice at all is] due to the fact that it is impossible [for ordinary people] to recognize [that] this [person is] of this kind [i.e., endowed with properties such as extraordinary perception, and] not because [we would] not accept [the existence of this person], for such [persons certainly] say the truth (*avitathābhīdhāyin*).⁸²

These two passages highlight several features of practical rationality which we are already familiar with, such as its being sharply contrasted with non-critical adhesion and the fact that it is the only thing that can be resorted to by “ignorant” (*ajñā*) ordinary persons.⁸³ But as expressions such as “it is better that (s)he act in this way” (*varam evaṃ pravṛttaḥ*) and “I may in all probability be successful” (*api nāma... arthavān syām*) suggest, practical rationality involves a

⁸² PVSV 110,3–8: *sarva evāgamam anāgamam vā pravṛttikāmo 'nveṣate prekṣāpūrvakāri na vyasanena / api nāmānuṣṭheyam ato jñātvā pravṛtto 'rthavān syām iti / sa śakyadarśanāvisamvādapratyayenānyatrāpi pravartate / evamprāyatvāl lokavyavahārasya / puruṣaparīkṣayā tu pravṛttāv apravṛttir eva / tasya tathābhūtasya jñātum aśakyatvān nāniṣṭeḥ / tādrśām avitathābhīdhānāt /*

⁸³ PVSV 175,27–176,4: *āgamam pramāṇam tadādarśitārthapratipattaye 'jño janaḥ samanveṣate samadhigatayāthātathyānām upadeśānapekṣatvāt / ajñasya cātīndriyaguṇapurūṣavivecane 'sāmarthyāt / vacanānām samihitārthasattām antareṇāpi vṛttiṃ paśyato bhavitavyam evādrṣṭavyabhicāravacasām api puruṣāṇām vāci śaṅkayā kiṃ yathārthā na veti / tena na yuktam anena kasyacid vacanena kiṃcin niścetum /* “It is the ignorant person who looks at scripture as a means of valid cognition in order to put into practice its teachings[, and this for two reasons: first,] because [those] who have thoroughly understood the truth do not [need to] resort to the instruction [of others any longer]; and [second,] because the ignorant person cannot discriminate human beings whose [mental] qualities are inaccessible to the senses [and therefore he cannot recognize a trustworthy person]. Someone who sees that statements occur even in the absence of the desired meaning must indeed be beset with doubt – [asking himself,] ‘Is it true or not?’ – even in the case of the discourse of people whose utterances have not been observed to be fallacious. Therefore, the [ignorant person] cannot ascertain anything by means of someone’s statement.” Translation Eltschinger et al. 2012, pp. 75–76.

conspicuous element of *uncertainty* as to the result of one's action and basically amounts to the *maximization* of one's chances of practical success. As we shall see, this is due to the fact that ordinary people have no direct cognition of future events and cannot validly infer the effect from the cause. The following statement by Kamalaśīla encapsulates all we already know about the rational agent's attitude when dealing with scripture:

One observes that certain [persons], unable as they are to live without resorting to scriptural authority because they learn [from scripture what] great benefits or evils [are to be expected from] engaging in or abstaining from certain [actions/intentions] whose results [remain entirely] imperceptible [to them, and that certain persons, then,] act on the basis of [human] speech. But for all that, they do not fall short of rationality, because they act due to an excellent means (*abhyupāya*, Tib. *thabs khyad par can*). There is indeed no other means (*abhyupāya*, Tib. *thabs*) than scripture to act with regard to something radically imperceptible. Now one is necessarily to act on the basis of a sound scripture (*svāgama*), for those who [would] adopt scriptures that are contradicted [by ordinary means of valid cognition] would not act rationally. But how could they not be rational if they act by relying on a non-contradicted scripture, since only this [kind of scripture] is a good means? ... What could oppose the action of a rational [person who acts] with the thought that the full realization of the thing as it has been promised [by scripture] will occur one day? And further, it is unjustified to abstain [from action] out of the suspicion that [this realization] might fail to occur, because one also acts out of uncertainty about something profitable, [for] otherwise, ... one would not act towards anything [any longer] because one would suspect the non-occurrence of the result.⁸⁴

⁸⁴ TSP_K 4,1–8/TSP_S 4,23–5,4 and TSP_K 4,12–16/TSP_S 5,10–14: *yāvatā dr̥śyante hi kecid apratyakṣaphalānāṃ keṣāṃcit pravṛttinivṛtṭyor mahā- [nu]śaṃsāpāyaśravaṇād anāśrityāgamaprāmāṇyam āsitum aśaknuvanto vacanāt pravartamānāḥ / na caitāvatā teṣāṃ prekṣāvattāhāniḥ / abhyupāyenaiva pravṛtteḥ / na hy āgamād ṛte 'tyantaparokṣārthaviṣaye pravṛttāv anyo 'bhyupāyo 'sti / avaśyaṃ ca pravartitavyaṃ svāgamāt⁽¹⁾ / vyāhatāgamaparigrahaṃ hi kurvāṇā apreṣāpūrvakāriṇaḥ syuḥ / avyāhatāgamasamāśrayeṇa tu pravṛttau kathaṃ na prekṣāvanto bhaveyuh / tasyaiva samyagupāyātvāt / ... kadācid yathāpratijñātārthaparisaṃpāptir bhaviṣyatīti mattvā prekṣāvataḥ pravṛtṭiḥ kena vāryeta / na cāpy asam-*

2.3. Let us now have a closer look at the Buddhist epistemologists' "theories of action." Since all the undertakings (*ārambha*) of so-called rational or judicious persons imply a goal (*upeya*, *prayojana*, *artha*),⁸⁵ these persons are justified in trying to determine the results (*phala*, *sādhyā*) they can reasonably expect from the use of a certain means (*upāya*, *sādhana*). Let us consider the level of everyday action and take the practice of farmers (*kṛṣīvala*, *karṣaka*) as an example. Repeated practice and observation have taught them that seeds (*bīja*) of a given kind are capable of yielding the result they expect from them, i.e., a good crop (*sasya*). Although their work (ploughing, sowing, etc.) and its expedients (seeds, etc.) generally bring about the desired result, agriculturists are not unaware of the fact that the ultimate occurrence of this result might well be impeded by unhappy events such as drought or storms. In other words, they can at best infer their work's *fitness* for bringing about the expected results, or equivalently, the *possibility* that these results occur, because to infer the actual occurrence of the results themselves would suppose they can ascertain (*niścaya*) the absence of any impediment.⁸⁶ Farmers, then, act with uncertainty or doubt (*saṁśaya*) regarding the future and hence imperceptible results of their endeavours. To put it in a more technical way, farmers resort to the kind of non-perception called *adrśyānupalabdhi*, i.e., the non-perception of things that are out of cognitive reach (*viprakṛṣṭa*, *viprakarṣin*) in terms of space, time and/or mode of being (*svabhāva*, *dravya*). Since this type of non-perception does not allow for any certainty regarding a given

*bhavāśaṅkayā nivṛttir yuktā / arthasaṁśayenāpi pravṛtतेḥ / anyathā ...
phalāsambhavāśaṅkāyāḥ sambhavāt kvacid api pravṛttir na syāt /*

⁽¹⁾Pātan (2a2) as well as Jaisalmer (3a1,2) MSS unambiguously read *svāgamāt*, against TSP_K's and TSP_S's unsatisfactory *tv āgamāt*; the reading *svāgamāt* is, however, not supported by TSP_T D135b3/P162b1 (*luñ las*).

⁸⁵ TSP_K 76,17–18/TSP_S 97,16–17: *prekṣāpūrvakāripravṛtतेḥ prayojanavat-tayā vyāptatvāt* (quoted and translated in McClintock 2010: 59 n. 135); note also PVinṬ D4b1/P5a1: *rtog pa dan ldan pa'i rtsom pa thams cad ni dgos pas khyab pa'i phyir*; NBṬ 11,3: *tathā hi sarve prekṣāvantaḥ pravṛt-tiprayojanam anviṣya pravartante*; VNṬ 3,12–13: *yat prayojanarahitaṁ tat prekṣāpūrvakāribhir nārabhyate*.

⁸⁶ On this point, see Steinkellner 1991: 725–726.

thing's existence or non-existence, Dharmakīrti explicitly describes it as a dubious cognition.⁸⁷ This amounts to saying that this non-perception *should* compel our farmers *not* to treat this thing as existent (*sadvyavahāra*), hence invite them to abstain from action (*apavrṛtti*, *pravṛttiniṣedha*).⁸⁸ But let us consider the following passage of the PVSV:

This [kind of] non-perception is not a means of valid cognition at all, because the means of valid cognition result in [decisive] determination. Indeed, this [non-perception] does not provide the mind with any certain decision as to [one's] abstaining from action.⁸⁹ [And] indeed, people [such as farmers] also act out of uncertainty with regard to certain [things such as seeds]. But since, if one were to act out of certainty [only], this [non-perception] is in this way beyond reproach [as a reason for inactivity], it is said to result in inactivity.⁹⁰

According to Śākyabuddhi, the *adrśyānupalabdhi* is an irreproachable reason for refraining from action “if a rational agent is to act out of certainty [only], hence for those who admit that one aims at an action that conforms to certainty [only].”⁹¹

⁸⁷ See PVin 2 73,12–13/PVin_T 2 24*,2–6 as well as Steinkellner 1979: 81.

⁸⁸ See PVin 2 73,5–74,1/PVin_T 2 23*,22–24*,9 as well as Steinkellner 1979: 80–81.

⁸⁹ PVT_T Je D230a7–b1/P268b2–3 = PVSVT_T 373,19–20: *saṃśāye sati na pravartitavyam avaśyam ity evaṃ niścitaṃ ceto na karotīty arthaḥ* /. Cf. the French expression: “Dans le doute, abstiens-toi.”

⁹⁰ PVSV 102,14–18: *naiva... iyaṃ anupalabdhiḥ pramāṇaṃ vyavasāyaphalatvāt pramāṇānām / na hi pravṛttiniṣedhe 'pīyaṃ niḥśaṅkaparicchedaṃ cetaḥ karoti / saṃśāyād api kvacil lokasya pravṛtṭeḥ / tathā tv etan niravadyaṃ yadi niścayapūrvam vyavahared iti seyam apravṛtṭiphalā proktā* /.

⁹¹ PVT_T Je D230b2/P268b4–5: *gal te rtog pa sñon du gtoñ ba can nes pa sñon du 'gro ba'i tha sñad du byed pa can yin pa de'i phyir nes pa ji lta ba bžin du 'jug pa don du gñer bar 'dod pa la'o //*. As for Karṇakagomin (PVSVT_T 373,22–26), he explains Dharmakīrti's final remark in the light of Dharmottara's conclusive statement on PVin 2 73,5–74,1/PVin_T 2 23*,22–24*,9 (PVin_T P282a7–b1): *tena rūpeṇaitad apravṛttikāraṇam anupalambhākhyam niravadyam nirdoṣam yadi niścayapūrvam vyavaharet kaścit* /

What does all this amount to? In the case of things that are (at least *hic et nunc*) inaccessible with regard to space, time or mode of being, or a combination thereof, just as the farmers' future crops are, non-perception is not a means of valid cognition since it does not allow one to ascertain these things' existence or non-existence, and hence leaves open the question whether one should treat them as existent (and engage in action) or rather as non-existent (and refrain from action). However, one observes that people such as farmers do *not* refrain from action, i.e., they engage in action in spite of this uncertainty. In other words, "doubt about something profitable is also a cause of action for rational [persons]."⁹² Now are these persons rational, if uncertainty as to the existence of the desired result does not prevent them from engaging in action? Can they be described as rational at all? Śākyabuddhi provides us with an important statement in this connection:

pramāṇapūrvaṃ sadvyavahārādi pravartayet / ity anena dvāreṇa seyam adṛśyānupalabdhir apravṛttiphalā proktā / niścitasadvyavahārādipra-tiṣedhaphalā proktā / sandigdhas tu sadvyavahārādir na niṣidhyata iti puruṣasya pravṛttir bhavaty api / "In this [particular] form, the reason for inactivity called 'non-perception' is beyond reproach, i.e., faultless, if someone were to act out of certainty [only], i.e., [if someone] were to engage in the treatment [of something] as existent, etc., with a means of valid cognition. So, i.e., in this respect, non-perception of an imperceptible [thing] is said to result in inactivity, i.e., is said to result in the negation of an ascertained treatment [of something] as existent, etc. But since it does not negate an uncertain treatment as existent, etc., human being[s] nevertheless engage in action." Karṇakagomin's indebtedness to Dharmottara here was first noticed by Yaita (1985: 200 n. 94).

⁹² NBT 13,4: *arthasaṃśayo 'pi hi pravṛttyaṅgaṃ prekṣāvātām /* The text continues with (NBT 14,1): *anarthasaṃśayo 'pi nivṛttyaṅgam /* Note also PPar II 22,1–5: *gal te 'jig rten the tshom las kyan 'jug par mi 'gyur na ni the tshom za na ldog par bya ba yin na gan gi phyir 'jug pa yin pa des na the tshom ldog par byed pa ma yin no //* "If [ordinary] people did not engage in action out of doubt also, [then] they should abstain [from action] in case of doubt; [but] since they [nevertheless] engage in action, doubt [clearly] does not prevent [them from engaging in action]." See Krasser 1991: II 62.

“If one is acting out of doubt, how is it correct to say that people who do so are rational? – What is the contradiction here? Not only [one] who acts out of certainty is a rational [person]. There are indeed two causes that compel one to act: doubt about something profitable (*artha*) and certainty about something profitable. Inactivity also has two causes: doubt about [something] unprofitable (*anartha*) and certainty about [something] unprofitable. A person who acts out of the first two causes and a person who does not act out of the second two is what the world means by a rational person. If acting without certainty is so unusual, then it would be contradictory for farmers, etc., to work in the fields and so on, for they have no means of valid cognition that can ascertain that their future wheat and such will grow.”⁹³

⁹³ PVṬ Ñe D72b2–5/P87b4–88a1: *gal te the tshom gyi sgo nas`jug pa yin na ji ltar rtog pa sñon du soñ ba can`žes bya že na /`di la`gal ba ci yod / gañ kho na ñes pa`i sgo nas`jug par`gyur ba de ñid rtog pa sñon du soñ ba can ma yin no // de ltar na`jug par byed pa la don la the tshom za ba dañ don ñes pa dañ rgyu rnam pa gñis yin no // ldog pa la yañ don med pa la the tshom za ba dañ don med par ñes pa gñis kho na yin no // de la dañ po ñid kyi rgyu gñis kyis`jug par`gyur ba gañ yin pa dañ phyis bśad pa gñis kyis ldog par`gyur ba gañ yin pa de ni rtog pa sñon du soñ ba can yin par`jig rten dag brjod do // gal te ñes pa med pa⁽¹⁾ ñid kyi sgo nas`jug par byed par`gyur ba ño mtshar yin na /`o na ni žiñ pa la sogs pa žiñ la sogs pa la`jug par byed pa`gal bar`gyur te / de dag la ma`oñs pa`i`bru la sogs pa`grub pa la ñes par byed pa`i tshad ma yod pa ma yin no //.*

⁽¹⁾em. : DP om. *med pa*.

Translation Dunne 2004: 291 n. 126, partly modified. Parallel passages as well as internal consistency suggest that Tib. *don med pa* should not be understood as a Skt. *arthābhāva*, but rather as a Skt. *anartha*. The same fourfold structure can be found in DhPr 13,23–14,8 ad NBṬ 13,4 (*arthaniścaya, arthasaṃśaya, anarthasaṃśaya, anarthaniścaya*). TSP_K 4,16/TSP₅ 5,14 makes clear that, as we already know from the preceding discussion, *arthasaṃśaya* includes (or: is doctrinally equivalent with) *phalāsambhavāśānkā*; to read Tib. *don med pa* as a Skt. *arthābhāva/arthāsambhava* would then be redundant. Furthermore, as TSP_K 4,17/TSP₅ 5,15 also makes clear, *anartha* should be understood in the sense of *aniṣṭaphalāvāpti* (with the negation bearing on *iṣṭa* and not on *avāpti*), i.e., in the sense of: “(obtainment of) an undesirable result.” In his PVinṬ (D4a3–5/P4b3–5) and NBṬ (14,4–15,1), Dharmottara himself lists respectively four and five *don med pa`i the tshom/anarthasambhāvanā* in the case of which a rational person would not engage himself with a

Śākyabuddhi's opponent contends that rationality entails acting out of certainty only. Śākyabuddhi quite strikingly replies that it is just the opposite, i.e., that he who only acts out of certainty is behaving in an irrational way, thus clearly implying that rational persons *also* act out of uncertainty, just as farmers do.

2.4.1. Is it, then, that these persons are at least in a position to *infer* the *arising* of a future result out of their present-day actions? Certainly not, at least, again, according to Dharmakīrti and his followers. In order to understand why ordinary persons behave rationally when engaging in action towards an imperceptible and *per se* non-inferable result, we have to turn to an important theoretical structure that was expected to safeguard the rationality of the inference of an effect – to be more precise, of the *possibility* of an effect. As we shall see, this logical device laid the theoretical foundations of all the subsequent Buddhist accounts of human rationality and pervades all of the epistemologists' apologetic strategies. Note, however, that Dharmakīrti himself seems *not* to have merged his concept of practical rationality into this logical framework, an achievement that the 8th-century philosophers Arcaṭa and especially Kamalaśīla are to be credited with.

2.4.2. Is the inference of an effect out of a cause (*kāryānumāna*) as legitimate as the inference of a cause out of its effect (*kāraṇānumāna*)? Early Buddhist and Naiyāyika philosophers seem to have answered this question affirmatively, as can be easily evidenced by passages from the HV and the NBh.⁹⁴ The “unorthodox” Sāṃkhya

treatise.

⁹⁴ HV 13*,15–14*,5: *hetuphalato 'numānaṃ katamat. yad dhetunā phalasya phalena vā hetor abhyūhanam. tad yathā gatyā deśāntaraprāptim anu-minoti, deśāntaraprāptyā gatim, rājārādhana mahābhisāralābham, mahābhisāralābhena rājārādhanam, sukṛtasampannakarmāntatayā mahāadhanadhānyalābham, mahāadhanadhānyalābhena sukṛtasampannakarmāntatām, prāktanena sucaritaduścaritena sampattivipattī, sampattivipattibhyāṃ prākṛtaṃ sucaritaduścaritam, prabhūtabhojanena tṛptim, tṛptyā prabhūtabhojanam, viṣamabhojanena vyādhim, vyādhinā viṣamabhojanam, dhyānena vairāgyam, vairāgyena dhyānam, mārgeṇa śrāmaṇyaphalam, śrāmaṇyaphalena mārgam. ity evambhāgīyaṃ hetu-*

thinker Vārṣagaṇya was likely one of the first to call the legitimacy of this inference into question. According to a fragment (?) of his *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, Vārṣagaṇya held the inference of the effect (the so-called *pūrvavadanumāna*) to be spurious (*vyabhicārin*).⁹⁵ Although the frag-

phalato 'numānaṃ veditavyam. "What does the inference out of causality (*hetuphalataḥ*) consist in? It consists in the deduction of the effect out of the cause, or of the cause out of the effect. For example, one infers [one's] reaching another place out of motion, motion out of [one's] reaching another place; [one infers] the acquisition of an important gift (BḤSD 59b s.v. *abhisāra*) out of [one's] propitiating the king, [one's] propitiating the king out of the acquisition of an important gift; [one infers] the acquisition of much money and grain out of a successful (*sukṛtasampanna*) business, a successful business out of the acquisition of much money and grain; [one infers] welfare and misfortune out of [one's] past good and bad conduct, previous (*prākṛta*) good and bad conduct out of [present] welfare and misfortune; [one infers] satiety out of abundant food, abundant food out of satiety; [one infers] disease out of rotten food, rotten food out of disease; [one infers] renouncement (*vairāgya*) out of meditative trance, meditative trance out of renouncement; [one infers] the result of religious life out of the path, [or] the path out of the result of religious life. The inference out of causality is to be known as [being] of such a kind." NBh 12,7–9: *pūrvavad iti / yatra kāraṇena kāryam anumīyate / yathā meghonnatyā bhaviṣyati vṛṣṭir iti / śeṣavat tad yatra kāryeṇa kāraṇam anumīyate / pūrvodakaviparītam udakam nadyāḥ pūrṇatvam śīghrataratvam ca dṛṣṭvā srotaso 'numīyate bhūtā vṛṣṭir iti /*. "By '*pūrvavat*,' [we intend an inference] in which one infers the effect out of the cause, as [when one infers] that there will be rain because of the rising of clouds. By '*śeṣavat*,' [we intend] that [inference] in which one infers the cause out of the effect, [as when one infers] that there has been rain after observing that the water of the river is different from the water of before and that the stream is [more] abundant and raging [than before]." On the question of the meaning of *pūrvavat* and *śeṣavat* in NS 1.1.5, see Wezler 1969. Uddyotakara already criticised naive interpretations of this NBh passage (see NV 43,17–44,6).

⁹⁵ PST_T Ye D124b1–3 as edited in Frauwallner 1958: 124–125: *spyir mthoñ ba'i rjes su dpag pa 'di yañ rnam gñis te / sña ma dañ ldan pa dañ lhag ma dañ ldan pa'o // de la sña ma dañ ldan pa ni gañ gi tshe rgyu ma tshañ ba med pa mthoñ nas 'bras bu 'byuñ bar 'gyur ba ñid rtogs pa ste / dper na sprin byuñ ba mthoñ nas char ba 'byuñ bar 'gyur ba ñid lta bu'o // lhag ma dañ ldan pa ni gañ gi tshe 'bras bu grub pa mthoñ nas rgyu byuñ zin pa ñid rtogs pa ste / dper na chu kluñ gсар du chu 'phel ba mthoñ ba nas*

ment remains silent on this author's argument against this kind of inference, one may hypothesize that Vārṣagaṇya objected to it on the grounds that an obstruction (*pratibandha*) might hamper the causal process and thus prevent the effect from arising. This is, at least, the intent of an objection that occurs in an interesting passage of the YD:

Among the [three kinds of inference,] the *pūrvavat*[-inference is the one which is resorted to] when, having observed that a cause has arisen, one concludes that the effect is about to occur (*bhaviṣyattva*), as [it is the case when one concludes] that rain must occur with the rising of the clouds. [Objection:] The example [you adduce] is not [correct], because it is inconclusive. Indeed, the rising of the clouds is not necessarily the cause of rain, because an obstruction [consisting of] a factor such as wind is possible. [Answer:] But if, having observed the unopposed (*apratiyogin*) capacity of the cause, supported by the additional (*antara*) capacities of the cooperating [factors], one concludes the manifestation of the effect, then [the inference is] a *pūrvavat*[-inference]; for instance, when [one concludes] a pot [is being made] after having perceived a lump of clay fashioned (*adhiṣṭhita*) by a working potter furnished with instruments such as a wheel, water and a pole.⁹⁶

sprin byuñ ba ñid lta bu'o // de la sna ma dañ ldan pa'i rjes su dpag pa ni 'khrul pa'o // lhag ma dañ ldan pa rnam par dpyad par dañ bcas pa ni 'khrul pa med pa'o //. "Auch diese (Art der) Schlußfolgerung, das Sehen dem Gemeinsamen nach, ist zweifach, (Schlußfolgerung) mit Früherem (*pūrvavat*) und mit Restlichem (*śeṣavat*). Davon liegt (Schlußfolgerung) mit Früherem vor, wenn man Ursachen vollzählig gesehen hat und daraus das bevorstehende Eintreten der Wirkung erkennt, wie das bevorstehende Eintreten von Regen, wenn man das Aufsteigen der Wolken gesehen hat. (Schlußfolgerung) mit Restlichem liegt vor, wenn man das Eintreten einer Wirkung sieht und daraus erkennt, daß die Ursache vorhanden war, z.B. (wenn man erkennt), daß Wolken vorhanden waren, weil man sieht, daß das Wasser eines Flusses neuerdings anschwillt. Davon ist die Schlußfolgerung mit Früherem fehlerhaft. Die Schlußfolgerung mit Restlichem, wenn sie wohl überlegt ist, ist nicht fehlerhaft." Translation Frauwallner 1958: 128.

⁹⁶ YD 83,6–84,2: *tatra pūrvavad yadā kāraṇam abhyuditaṃ drṣṭvā bhaviṣyattvaṃ kāryasya pratipadyate yathā meghodaye bhavitavyatā vṛṣṭeḥ / āha – naitad asty udāharaṇam anekāntāt / na hi meghodayo 'vaśyaṃ vṛṣṭeḥ kāraṇam bhavati vāyvādinimittapratibandhasambhavāt / ucyate – yadi tarhi kāraṇasaktiṃ sahakāriśaktyantarānugrhitām apratiyoginīm*

As this excerpt clearly testifies, the author of the YD was not ready to rule out any possibility of inferring the effect out of the cause and consequently submitted this inference to additional requirements. According to him, the inference is justified provided one has observed the *unimpeded* efficacy of *all* the causal factors involved in the process.

Now, this brings us very close to Dharmakīrti's own solution. To put it in a nutshell: According to PVSV 6,22–7,12, one cannot infer the rise of an effect (*kāryotpatti*) itself because an impediment⁹⁷ may present itself within the causal process, hence hampering the production of the effect. The best and only thing one can do in such a case is to infer, instead of the rise of the effect itself, the *fitness* of the complete cause for giving rise to its effect (*kāryotpādanayogyatā*) or, equivalently, the *possibility* of the effect's arising (*kāryotpattisambhava*). As is obvious, both fitness and possibility are essential properties of the complete cause or causal complex. In other words, the only way to allow for some kind of inference from cause to effect is to interpret the logical reason "complete cause" as a logical reason consisting of an essential property.⁹⁸

*dr̥ṣṭvā kāryasya vyaktim̐ pratipadyate tadyathā yadā cakrodakadaṇḍā-
disādhanasampannena vyāpāravatā kumbhakāreṇādhiṣṭhitam̐ mṛdam
upalabhya ghaṭasya tadā pūrvavat /.*

⁹⁷ Dharmakīrti defines an impediment (*pratibandha*) in the following way (PVin 2 61,3–4/PVin_r 2 13*,20–22): *kāryotpattiviguṇotpādanalakṣaṇa-
tvāt pratibandhasya /.* See Steinkellner 1979: 54, 1991: 726 and 1999: 350 n. 9.

⁹⁸ On the reduction of *kāraṇahetu* to *svabhāvahetu*, see also Iwata 1991: 86–87 and Krasser 1991: II 107–109 n. 263–266. PVSV 6,22–7,10 and PV 1.7–8: *yas tarhi samagreṇa hetunā kāryotpādo 'numīyate sa katham̐
trividhe hetāv antarbhavati / hetunā yaḥ samagreṇa kāryotpādo 'nu-
mīyate / arthāntarānapekṣatvāt sa svabhāvo 'nuvarṇitaḥ // asāv api
yathāsam̐nihitān nānyam̐ apekṣata iti tanmātrānubandhī svabhāvo
bhāvasya / tatra hi kevalam̐ samagrāt kāraṇāt kāryotpattisambhavo
'numīyate samagrāṇām̐ kāryotpādanayogyatānumānāt / yogyatā ca
sāmagrīmātrānubandhinīti svabhāvabhūtaivānumīyate / kiṃ punaḥ kā-
raṇasāmagryāḥ kāryam̐ eva nānumīyate / sāmagrīphalaśaktinām̐ pari-
ṇāmānubandhini / anaikāntikatā kārye pratibandhasya sambhavāt //*

na hi samagrāṇīty eva kāraṇadravyāṇi svakāryaṃ janayanti / sāmagrī-janmanāṃ śaktīnāṃ pariṇāmāpekṣatvāt kāryotpādasya / atrāntare ca pratibandhasambhavān na kāryānumānam / yogyatāyās tu dravyāntarānapekṣatvān na virudhyate'numānam / uttarottaraśaktipariṇāmeṇa kāryotpādanasamartheyaṃ kāraṇasāmagrī / śaktipariṇāmapratyaya-syānyasyāpekṣaṇīyasyābhāvād iti /. “[Objection:] But the arising of an effect that is inferred out of a complete cause, how is it included in the threefold [logical] reason [that consists of essential property, effect and non-perception]⁽¹⁾? [Answer:] The arising of an effect that is inferred out of a complete cause is described as an essential property [of this complete cause], because it does not depend on something else. Since the [arising of the effect] itself does not depend on [anything] other than the [causal complex] as it is present, it relates to nothing but this [causal complex and hence is] an essential property of this thing [called the complete causal complex]. [And] indeed, [what] is inferred out of the complete cause, in this case, [is] only the possibility that the effect arises, because [it is] the complete [causal factors'] fitness for generating [their] effect [that] one infers. And since [this] fitness relates to nothing other than the [complete] causal complex, it is as an essential property [of this causal complex] that it is inferred. [Objection:] But why is it not the effect itself that one infers out of the causal complex? [Answer:] An effect depends on the [successive] transformations of the [causal] efficacies that result from the [preceding phases of the] causal complex; [cause as a logical reason] is inconclusive with regard to [this] effect, because an obstruction [hindering this transformation process] may occur. Indeed, it is not simply because they are complete [i.e., present,] that the causal factors (*dravya*) generate their own effect, because the arising of an effect depends on the [successive] transformations of the efficacies that are born of [each phase of] the causal complex. Now since an obstruction may occur in the meantime (*atrāntare*), one does not infer the effect [itself]. To the contrary, the inference of the [complete cause's] fitness [for bringing about its effect] is not contradicted, because [this fitness] does not depend on any factor other [than this complete cause itself. And this inference has the following form:] Due to the [final] transformation of [its] successive efficacies, this complex of causes is capable of generating an effect, because no further (*anya*) condition for the transformation of [its] efficacy is required (*apekṣaṇīya*).”

⁽¹⁾PVṬ Je D19b4–5 ≈ PVSṬ 43,11–14 (*pūrvapakṣa*): *sa kathaṃ kāraṇākhyo hetus trividhe svabhāvakāryānupalambhākhye hetāv antarbhavati / na tāvad anupalabdau vidhisādhanatvāt / kāraṇasvabhāvāt na kāryahetau / arthān-*

2.4.3. As stated above, the 8th-century Buddhist philosophers Arcaṭa and Kamalaśīla are to be credited with the development of a unified concept of practical rationality based on Dharmakīrti's reinterpretation of the *kāryānumāna*. Until the mid-8th century, the Buddhist epistemologists' depiction of practical rationality and the rational agent acting out of doubt formed a rather peripheral appendix to Dharmakīrti's account of the *adrśyānupalabdhi*; their treatment of the topic drew heavily on an allegedly common-sense understanding of practical rationality as well as on empirical observation of everyday human action itself. The issue actually gained prominence and systematicity with the epistemologists' growing interest in the aim of a treatise (*śāstraprayojana*). Particularly noteworthy in this connection is the figure of Arcaṭa, the main target of Kamalaśīla's lengthy commentary on the first six verses of Śāntarakṣita's TS.⁹⁹ Suffice it to say here that Arcaṭa tried to play down the part of uncertainty in human action by reassessing the nature of certainty/ascertainment in the general framework of purposeful action.¹⁰⁰

tareṇārthāntarasyaṇumānān na svabhāvaḥetau / "How is it that the logical reason designated as a '[complete] cause' is included in the threefold logical reason designated as 'essential property,' 'effect' and 'non-perception'? To begin with, it is not [included] in non-perception, for it is a positive argument; it is [also] not included in the effect as a logical reason, for it has the nature of a cause, nor in the essential property as a logical reason, for it consists in the inference of one thing out of another." For the general context of this passage, see Steinkellner 1991: 713–718 (with an English translation).

⁹⁹ See Funayama 1995.

¹⁰⁰ HBṬ 2,3–9 (see Funayama 1995: 184–185): *prekṣāvataṃ pravṛttiḥ prayojanārthināṃ tadupāye tadbhāvanīscayāt / yathā kṛṣṇivalādīnām⁽¹⁾ sasyādyupāye bijādāv abijādivivekenāvadhṛtabijādibhāvānām / anyathā hy anīscitopāyānām upeyārthināṃ pravṛtttau prekṣāvattaiva hīyeta / upeye tu bhāvinī pramāṇavyāpārāsambhavād anīscaye 'pi vivecitopāyāḥ pratibandhavaikalyayor asambhave योग्यम एतद विवक्षितम् कार्याम् निष्पदायितुम् इति सम्भवानयं प्रवृत्तौ प्रेक्षवत्ता[या]⁽²⁾ अतो ना ह्येतेन /*

⁽¹⁾HBṬ 239,8–9: *karṣakāpi bijādiviṣaye buddhipūrvakāriṇa iti prekṣāvattva-puraskāreṇodāharaṇam*; ⁽²⁾as Funayama rightly points out, Sanghavi's reading *prekṣāvattā* makes no sense (see Funayama 1995: 185 n. 17 for other syntactical hypotheses). "[When] rational [persons] who aim at a [given] goal

Though Arcaṭa admits that the future and hence non-cognizable results of actions cannot be ascertained, he holds practical rationality to consist in certainty with regard to the *means* itself. Especially noteworthy is his appeal to Dharmakīrti's *kāryānumāna* theorem as being the psychological pattern underlying rational beings' interaction with duly ascertained means. However, the process which led to a full-fledged practical interpretation of the said theorem seems to have been completed by Kamalaśīla in the framework of his critique of Arcaṭa's views. In response to Arcaṭa's view that ordinary people act out of certainty only on the grounds that the means of their practical endeavours are ascertained, Kamalaśīla states the following:

This is incorrect, for what is at stake here is that the [person] *x*, whose action aims at [the result] *y*, acts even if [(s)he feels] uncertain about *y*. Moreover, [people] such as farmers do not act toward these [seeds, etc.,] for the sake of the instrumental means [itself], so that one [could] describe their action as accompanied by certitude because they possess certitude about the instrumental means, but they act with regard to it for the sake of the result [only]. Now since an impediment to the arising of the result is possible, there is no certainty [at all]. Therefore, their action is accompanied by uncertainty only.¹⁰¹

act toward the means of this [goal, they do so] due to [their previous] ascertainment of the fact that [this means] is [indeed] the [means toward the goal they are aiming at. In so doing, they behave] just like [people] such as farmers who, [when they act] toward the seeds, etc., which are a means toward the crop, etc., have [previously] determined that the seeds, etc., are [indeed the means], by distinguishing [them] from non-seeds, etc. Otherwise, if those who aim at a [given] goal were to act without having ascertained the means, they would indeed simply fall short of rationality. But even though [they can] not ascertain the future goal [itself], since the means of valid cognition cannot function [with regard to it], those who have determined the means do not fall short of rationality if they act based on the [following] assumption: "This is fitting for bringing about the intended (*vivakṣita*) effect, provided that neither an impediment nor an incompleteness [of the causal complex] occurs."

¹⁰¹ TSP_κ3,7-10/TSP_ς3,20-4,2: *tad asamyak / yad arthaṃ hi yasya pravṛttiḥ sā tatsaṃśaye 'pi tasya bhavatīty etāvad iha prakṛtam / na ca kṛṣṇivalādayaḥ sādhanārthaṃ teṣu⁽¹⁾ pravartante yena sādhanaviśayaniścayasadbhāvān niścayapūrvikā pravṛttir eṣāṃ⁽²⁾ upavarṇyate / kiṃ tarhi / phalārthaṃ te tatra pravartante / tatra ca phale pratibandhādīsambhāvān na niścayo*

According to Kamalaśīla, the epistemic value of the cognition underlying human decisions about action is not independent of the relative probability that the goal being aimed at will be achieved. Since an impediment might hamper the causal process, certainty as to any future result cannot be arrived at with any assuredness. This amounts to saying that farmers engage in action out of uncertainty only. In another passage, Kamalaśīla shapes a new set of arguments against Arcaṭa's views on practical rationality; in doing so, he puts the finishing touches to an adjustment of the *kāryānumāna* theorem on the issue of practical rationality:

Furthermore, even an [alleged] certainty of theirs with regard to the instrumental means, [insofar] as it [could only] depend upon the future result, might be either of a form such as: 'This [instrumental means] will necessarily realize a future result of that kind,' or of the form: 'This [instrumental means] is fitting for necessarily bringing about the desired result if neither an impediment nor an incompleteness of the cooperating [causes] presents itself.' To begin with, the first of the [two hypotheses] is incorrect[, and this for the following reason:] because one sees that a certain rice[-seed], etc., for which incompleteness of the cooperating [causes] or the intervention of an impediment (*pratibandhaka*) has occurred, is not an instrumental means towards a future result, even [though] one has observed [that it once had] such a result, one [cannot] rule out a doubt with regard to all [other rice-seeds. This is] what [Dharmakīrti] says:

'If an effect [itself], which depends on the transformations of the efficacies that result from [earlier phases of] the causal complex, [is to be inferred from a cause, this cause] is inconclusive [as a logical reason], because an impediment, etc., is possible.'

But if [one is inclined to believe] the second [hypothesis], then it is perfectly correct, because all [human] action that is accompanied by a means of valid cognition is of such a form only. And this is [the reason] why teachers [such as Dharmakīrti] have introduced here a specification (*viśeṣaṇa*) by means of the inference of [a complete cause's] fit-

'stīty ataḥ saṃśayapūrvikaiva teṣāṃ pravṛtṭiḥ /.

⁽¹⁾The Pātan (1b, above line 1) and Jaisalmer (2b2, above line 1) MSS read *bijādiṣu* (marginal note); ⁽²⁾the Pātan (1b, above line 1) and the Jaisalmer (2b2, above line 1) MSS read: *kṛṣivalānām* (marginal note).

ness [for bringing about the expected effect in the form]: ‘This [complete cause] is fit [for bringing about its effect] if there is no impediment.’ Furthermore, since in this [very] form the result is also ascertained, it is not the case that only the instrumental means is ascertained. But in an action of this kind, action is also not really (*paramārthataḥ*) established as [being] accompanied by an ascertainment of the result, because [ordinary people] with limited cognition cannot ascertain the absence of an impediment, etc.¹⁰²

2.5.1. In two important studies dedicated to Dharmakīrti’s reduction of the *kāraṇahetu* to a *svabhāvahetu*, E. Steinkellner (1991, 1999) has drawn the attention to Dharmakīrti’s likely intentions when reinterpreting the inference from cause to effect. E. Steinkellner holds “the true motivation for Dharmakīrti’s treating this particular inference ‘from cause to effect’ in its possibilities to be not logical, but soteriological, the path towards buddhahood itself being at stake.”¹⁰³ In other words, Dharmakīrti’s reinterpretation of the *kāryānumāna* into a logical structure entailing an essential property as logical reason provides the “progression towards buddhahood” with a “theo-

¹⁰² TSP_K 3,12–22/TSP_S 4,4–16: *api ca sādhananiścayo ’pi teṣāṃ bhāviphālāpekṣayā bhavann avaśyam etad anāgatam evaṃvidhaṃ phalaṃ sādhaiṣyatīty evaṃrūpo bhavet / yad vā pratibandhakasahakārivai-kalyayor asambhave saty avaśyam abhimataphalasampādanāyālam etad ity evaṃrūpaḥ / na tatra tāvad ādya yuktarūpaḥ / sambhavatsahakāri vaikalyapratibandhakopanipātasya kasyacid upalabdhatathāvidhaphalasyāpi śālyāder anāgataphalaṃ praty asādhanatvadarśanena sarvatrāśaṅkāyā avyāvṛtteḥ / yad āha / sāmagrīphalaśaktināṃ pariṇā-mānubandhini / anaikāntikatā kārye pratibandhādisambhavād iti / atha dvitīyas tadā yuktataram etat / evaṃrūpatvād eva sarvasyāḥ pramāṇapūrvikāyāḥ pravṛtteḥ / ata eva cācāryās tatra yogyatānumānena viśeṣaṇaṃ vidadhati / asati pratibandhe yogyam etad iti / kiṃtu phalam apy anena rūpeṇa niścitam eveti na sādhanasyaiva niścayaḥ / na cāpy evampravṛtttau paramārthataḥ phalaniścayapūrvikā pravṛtṭiḥ sidhyati / pratibandhādyasattvasyaivāparadarśanair⁽¹⁾ niścetum aśakyatvāt /.*

⁽¹⁾The Pātan (1b, above line 1) and Jaisalmer (2b2, below line 6) MSS read: *arvāk* (marginal note). Steinkellner’s (1991: 718) translation of PV 1.8, except for TSP’s *pratibandhādi*^o instead of PV’s *pratibandhasya*.

¹⁰³ Steinkellner 1991: 724.

retical frame,¹⁰⁴ and mirrors the Buddhist master's concern with investigating "whether a kind of 'progressive, proleptic causality,' necessarily to be acknowledged as a real soteriological fact ... was supportable on a rational level too."¹⁰⁵ E. Steinkellner's hypothesis is, then, "that Dharmakīrti's religious presuppositions as a Mahāyānist Buddhist must be considered as the final motivation for his elaborating the logical possibility of an inference of effect."¹⁰⁶ Although E. Steinkellner was unaware (and rightly so!) of any Dharmakīrtian *locus* that would testify to the Buddhist philosopher's conscious connection between the revised *kāryānumāna* theorem and the Buddhist path, he has shown how certain later developments, both within and without the circle of Buddhist scholars, consciously resorted to or at least implied this "structural scheme."¹⁰⁷

2.5.2. Before I turn to the texts that, in my opinion, provide full corroborative evidence for E. Steinkellner's hypothesis, let me add a few

¹⁰⁴ Steinkellner 1991: 726.

¹⁰⁵ Steinkellner 1999: 350–351. The progressive, entelechial or proleptic causality (on these expressions, see Steinkellner 1991: 734–735 n. 39 as well as the second thoughts expressed in Steinkellner 1999: 351 n. 16) analyzed in PVSV 6,22–7,12 is indeed, as Inami and Tillemans already hypothesized on the basis of Devendrabuddhi's comments on PV 2.146 (see Inami/Tillemans 1986: 126 n. 10, and more generally 1986: 125–127; see below, §2.5.3), the one "without which the whole 'progression towards buddhahood' as depicted in the *anuloma* section of the *Pramāṇavārttika* would be inconceivable and illusory" (Steinkellner 1991: 726; see also Steinkellner 1999: 351).

¹⁰⁶ Steinkellner 1991: 727.

¹⁰⁷ This seems to be the case in Prajñākaragupta's treatment of rebirth (see Franco 1997: 6–8, 109ff and 176ff), in a Buddhist *pūrvapakṣa* in Vācaspatimiśra's *Nyāyakandalī* (see Steinkellner 1991: 735 n. 47, 736 n. 52, Steinkellner 1999: 354–355, Pemwieser 1991: 43–47 and 109–147), in a short statement by Arcaṭa (HBṬ 2,7ff; see Steinkellner 1999: 355 n. 28, Funayama 1995: 187), and especially in (the pseudo-)Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasiddhi* (see Steinkellner 1991: 736 n. 53, Steinkellner 1999: 355–360), where "the whole text was composed by applying Dharmakīrti's *kāryānumāna* theorem as a model logical form" (Steinkellner 1999: 355).

comments. There can be little doubt that the revised *kāryānumāna* theorem, i.e., one's being justified in inferring the *possibility* of the result, served "soteriological" purposes in line with the insight born of rational reflection. In other words, I do believe that the proofs carried out on its basis were also designated to provide practitioners with firm conviction regarding the possibility of the Buddhist path and its result(s). After all, from the BoBh onwards, the *hetuvidyā* was not only expected to defeat non-Buddhist opponents, but also to strengthen the faith of the Buddhists themselves.¹⁰⁸ Moreover,

¹⁰⁸ The polemical purport of the *hetuvidyā* is emphasized in the MSA tradition (MSA 11.60: *anyeṣām... nigrahaṇ[āy]a*; MSABh 136,23–24: *dvitiye taddoṣaparijñānaṃ paravādinigrahaś ca /*; MSABh 70,16–17: *nigrahārtham anyeṣāṃ tadanadhimuktānām /*; MSAVBh D Mi 203a3: *mu stegs rgyu rig pa'i gtsug lag śes par rlom pa... tshar gcad par bya ba'i phyir*). Whereas the BoBh fully recognizes this polemical purpose (BoBh D68,14–15/W96,22–24: *hetuśāstram api dvyākāram / paropārambhakathānuśamsaparidīpanākāram parataś cetivādavipramokṣānuśamsaparidīpanākāram ca /*. "The *hetuśāstra* also has two aspects: [first,] it reveals the advantages [that can be drawn] from exhibiting (*kathā*) the faults (*upārambha*, BHSD) of [one's] opponent, and [second,] it reveals the advantages [which result] from escaping (*vipramokṣa*) this kind of critical discourse on the part of an opponent."), it also ascribes apologetic and catechetical aims to the *hetuvidyā*, as the following statement makes clear (BoBh D74,11–13/W105,13–16): *hetuvidyāṃ bodhisattvaḥ paryeṣate tasyaiva śāstrasya durbhāṣitadurlapitāyā yathābhūta-parijñānārtham paravādinigrahārtham cāprasannānām asmiñ śāsane prasādāya prasannānām ca bhūyobhāvāya /*. "The *bodhisattva* strives after the *hetuvidyā* (1) in order to get correctly acquainted with the defects and errors of this very science, (2) in order to defeat opponent debaters, (3) in order to [arouse] the faith in this [Buddhist] teaching in those who have no faith [in it], and (4) in order to increase/strengthen those who have faith [in it]." Does *prasannānām bhūyobhāvāya* (or, according to MVy 255,5–6: *abhiprasannānām bhūyobhāvāya /*) mean "in order to increase [the number] of those who have faith [in it]," or rather, "in order to strengthen [the faith] of those who [already] have faith [in it]"? According to *Sāgaramegha (BoBhVy D126a2–3/P153b5–6), the *hetuvidyā* helps those who have already developed faith in Buddhism (whom he also terms *zugs pa rnam*s) to strengthen (**sthāpana*?) their own Buddhist position (*svapakṣa*). This interpretation is also the one favoured by Sthiramati in MSAVBh D Mi 203a7: *bstan pa 'di la ma dad*

there is evidence that the Buddhist practitioner's appraisal of the possibility of the way was an issue in the Yogācāra tradition. Let me adduce two examples. The third section of the (śrāvakayānist) *Bhāvanāmayībhūmi* summarizes the path to (*nirupadhiśeṣa*)*nirvāṇa* according to ten items (*dharmā*). The first three, which are transitional between the *śrutamayī* and the *cintāmayī prajñās*,¹⁰⁹ are described as follows:

Based (*āgamyā*, Tib. *brten nas*) on this very insight born of listening [to the law, there appears] a threefold firm conviction (*abhisampratyaya*) with regard to the path and the result of the path, *nirvāṇa*: conviction (*sampratyaya*) that [they] exist, conviction that [they] are worthy (*guṇavat*), conviction that [they] are possible to obtain (*śakyaprāpti*) and endowed with a convenient means (*sukhopāya*, Tib. *thabs sla ba*) to [the hearer] himself.¹¹⁰

The *bahuvrīhi* compound *śakyaprāpti* occurs again in Vasubandhu's commentary on MSA 12.14ab, here clearly associated with the *cintāmayī prajñā*. According to the MSA, "the law is good because it is the cause of devotion, satisfaction and intellectual insight (*buddhi*),"¹¹¹ a statement upon which Vasubandhu comments as follows:

The law is good at the beginning, at the middle and at the end because, by means of audition, [rational] reflection and [mental] cultivation respec-

pa rnams dad pa bskyed pa dañ / dad pa bskyed pa rnams dad pa'i phyir zin 'phel bar bya ba'i phyir brtson par byed do //. "[The *bodhisattva*] gives himself up [to the *hetuvidyā*] so that those who have no faith develop faith in the [Buddhist] teaching and that those who have [already] developed faith [in it] intensify [their] faith." On the *hetuvidyā*, see also below, n. 115.

¹⁰⁹ These three convictions are described as instrumental in the rise of the insight born of cultivation (*bhāvanāmayajñānapariniṣpatti*).

¹¹⁰ *Bhāvanāmayībhūmiḥ* MS 140b3/D Tshi 264a3–4: *tām eva śrutamayīṃ prajñām āgamyā mārga mārgaphale ca nirvaṇe trividho 'bhisampratyayo 'stīvasampratyayo guṇavattvasampratyaya ātmanaḥ śakyaprāpti-sukhopāyasampratyayaḥ /*. I would like to express my sincere thanks to Alexander von Rospatt for having made the Sanskrit of this passage available to me.

¹¹¹ MSA 12.14ab: *kalyāṇo dharmo 'yaṃ hetutvād bhaktituṣṭibuddhīnām /*.

tively, it is the cause of devotion, satisfaction and intellectual insight. Among these, devotion is faith (*adhimukti*), conviction (*sampratya*) [regarding the path and the truths].¹¹² Satisfaction is the joy [that arises] after one has known, through rational examination (*yuktinidhyāna*), that [the supreme result]¹¹³ is possible to obtain (*śakyaprāpti*). [As for] intellectual insight, it consists in the concentrated mind's true knowledge.¹¹⁴

As we can see, assessing the possibility of the path, or the attainability of its result, was an issue addressed by earlier Yogācāra scholars in the framework of the insight born of reflection.

2.5.3. This being said, it seems no less certain that the Buddhist epistemologists once again turned a hermeneutic and soteriologically valued item into an apologetic device, thus externalizing it. As *hetuvidyā* specialists, the Buddhist epistemologists were supposed to neutralize their non-Buddhist opponents' attacks on the Buddhist path.¹¹⁵ Against materialists and Mīmāṃsakas, whose objections

¹¹² According to MSAVBh D Mi D240b1: *lam*⁽¹⁾ *dañ bden pa la sogs pa la mos śiñ yid ches pa la ni dad pa zes bya ste /*.

⁽¹⁾em. : *las D*.

¹¹³ According to MSAVBh D Mi D240b2: *'di ltar sems kyi śes rab kyis ni bla na med pa'i 'bras bu thob ciñ chos kyi don mthoñ bar nus te /*.

¹¹⁴ MSABh 82,1–4: *dharmā ādimadhyaparyavasānakalyāṇo yathākramaṃ śruticintābhāvanābhir bhaktituṣṭibuddhihetutvāt / tatra bhaktir adhimuktiḥ sampratyaḥ / tuṣṭiḥ prāmodyaṃ yuktinidhyānāc chakyaprāptitāṃ viditvā / buddhiḥ samāhitacittasya yathābhūtajñānam /*.

¹¹⁵ See above, n. 108. MSAVBh D Tsi 92b2–4: *[gtan tshigs rig pa] des ni mu stegs pa la sogs pa bdag dañ rtag par yod pa la sogs par grub pa'i gtan tshigs [su] mñon sum dañ rjes su dpag pa'i tshad ma dag smra ba la tshad mar mi ruñ ba'i ñes pa yod par rtog pa dañ / mu stegs pa la sogs pa'i phas kyi rgol ba rnams sañs rgyas kyi chos la sun 'byin pa dag mñon sum dañ rjes su dpag pa la sogs pa'i tshad mas tshar gcod ciñ mu stegs pa'i bdag tu smra ba'i gzuñ sun 'byin par byed de /* “[Opponents] such as the outsiders state that the means of valid cognition direct perception and inference are [valid] reasons establishing the self, permanence, etc.; by means of the *hetuvidyā*, [the *bodhisattva*] knows that [these outsiders] make mistakes that do not fit the means of valid cognition. By [resorting to] the means of valid cognition direct perception and inference,

tried to undermine the very possibility of the path (by denying rebirth and the nearly endless development of mental qualities such as compassion and insight), the Buddhist epistemologists shaped arguments that were expected to demonstrate its rationality and realizability. And they consistently grounded their apologetic attempts on the revised *kāryānumāna* theorem. As already suggested by M. Inami and T. Tillemans, this inference was already used by Devendrabuddhi when explaining the dual proof structure of PV 2:

“So, then, proceeding according to direct order (*lugs las ’byuñ ba = anu-roma*) [is as follows:] By means of the respective preceding causes, ‘desiring to benefit the world,’ etc., [Dharmakīrti] infers that the respective subsequent [effects] are all possible; and thus it is established that [the Bhagavat’s] being a *pramāṇa* is not *a priori* impossible (*śin tu mi srid pa = atyantā[sambhava]*). Now, proceeding in reverse order (*lugs pa las bzlog pa = pratiloma*), he intends to prove that the Bhagavat, who has the nature described [in the homage], is a *pramāṇa*, by validly showing that the respectively subsequent causes are proven because their respective subsequent effects are established. Thus he says, ‘Or, a protector is one who teaches the four [nobles’] truths.’”¹¹⁶

According to Devendrabuddhi, Dharmakīrti first demonstrates, on the basis of the reinterpreted *kāryānumāna*, that “desiring to benefit the world” (*jagaddhitaiṣin*) makes it possible to “be a teacher” (*śāstrtvā*), “being a teacher” makes it possible to “be a Sugata” (*sugatavā*), and finally, “being a Sugata” makes it possible to “be a protector” (*tāyitvā*) of suffering living beings. The epistemologists’

he defeats opponent debaters such as the outsiders who criticise the law of the Buddha (*buddhadharma*) and criticises the outsiders’ works teaching [the existence of] the self.”

¹¹⁶ PVP D61b6–7/P70b3–6: *de de ltar na lugs las ’byuñ ba la ’gro ba la phan par mdzad par b’zed pa ñid la sogs pa rgyu sña ma sña mas phyi ma phyi ma thams cad la srid pa’i rjes su dpag pas / tshad ma śin tu mi srid pa med pa rab tu bsgrubs nas / da ni lugs las bzlog pa ’bras bu phyi ma phyi ma rtogs pa’i sgo nas rgyu phyi ma phyi ma grub pa yañ dag par ston pas⁽¹⁾ bstan pa’i ño bo can gyi bcom ldan ’das tshad ma ñid bsgrub par ’dod pas / yañ na skyob bden pa b’zi ni ston mdzad yin ’zes bya ba smos te /.*

⁽¹⁾em. Inami/Tillemans : *pa D, par P*

Translation Inami/Tillemans 1986: 126.

apologetic recourse to this theorem can be observed throughout the tradition. It underlies Dharmottara's and Karṇakagomin's account of *nirvāṇa* and omniscience as resulting from uninterrupted mental cultivation:

Therefore, just as one infers a [given cause's] capacity [in thinking] that the causal complex of a seed is fit for bringing about the sprout, provided there is neither an impediment nor a lack [of cooperating factors], in the same way, one infers the possibility of dispassionateness and omniscience [in thinking] that the vividness of a cognition bearing on selflessness and on all entities is possible due to a long and uninterrupted [mental] cultivation, provided there is neither an impediment nor a lack [of cooperating factors].¹¹⁷

The reinterpreted *kāryānumāna* provides Śāṅkaranandana's *Sarvajñasiddhi* with a theoretical foundation:

Like [any] other effect, a cognition bearing on every [possible] object is possible provided its existence has known causes. [And it is] this possibility [of omniscience that] is stated [in the present treatise]. Here, [causes] such as earth have the capacity, [if they are] assembled [in a complex,] to bring about an unseen sprout, because one has [previously] perceived a sprout after an interval of time when these [causes] are present. Therefore, since this [sprout] possesses known causes, it is possible because that which possesses known causes is produced by the complex of its causes if they are tending to produce it². Therefore, just as one says that such an effect is possible because its causes are known, one [can] state that a cognition that directly realizes objects which are out of [ordinary cognitive] reach, due to location, time or nature, is possible because its causes are discerned. And it is this possibility that is stated [in the present treatise], i.e., [we state here that] what [we] call a known cause is arrived at by means of *pramāṇas*, [so that] omniscience is possible if one knows that [this] is the cause of per-

¹¹⁷ PVinṬ D282a2–5/P338a3–8 (PVSṬ 70,23–26): *tasmād yathāsati pratibandhavaikalye samartheyaṃ bījakāraṇasāmagry aṅkurotpādāyeti sāmartyānumānam / tadvad asati pratibandhavaikalye cirakālān nairantaryavataś cābhyāsavaśān⁽¹⁾ nairātmyaviṣayasya sarvapadārthaviṣayasya ca jñānasya sphuṭābhatvaṃ sambhavatīti vairāgyasarvajñatvayoḥ sambhavānumānam /*

⁽¹⁾PVinṬ : PVSṬ °vaśāc ca.

ceiving all objects. And although it is just as non-cognized as [pseudo-entities] like horns of a rabbit, it cannot be impossible [as they are, because?] one knows about its causes' fitness [for bringing it about when they are] complete.¹¹⁸

2.5.4. The credit for a systematic elaboration on soteriological rationality goes once again to Kamalaśīla, whose lengthy commentary on TS 3337(/8) is a fascinating epitome of Dharmakīrti's main religious ideas. Let us consider the kernel of his explanation. Here, Kamalaśīla enumerates eleven (or twelve) reasons that supposedly account for the fact that engagement in mental cultivation (and, therefore, cultivation reaching its highest and *ipso facto* salvational degree) is impossible (*asambhava*):

Neither can [our Mīmāṃsaka opponent] speak as follows: 'A [mental] cultivation of a kind that would result in this sort of perceptual cognition is impossible for anybody,' because [the one who speaks thus] must state a reason for [this] impossibility.

1 – the reason why one does not give oneself up to [mental] cultivation might indeed consist in the fact that it is purposeless to all [people], because the action of a rational [person always] implies purposefulness;

2 – or, even if it is purposeful, a rational [person] does not, due to ignorance of the nature of [the evil] to be eliminated, engage [in mental

¹¹⁸ *Sarvajñāsiddhi*, k. 2 and part of the autocommentary thereon (MS 1b1–4):

*jñātakāraṇasadbhāvā sambhavīny anyakāryavat /
sarvārthaviṣayā samvit sa hi sambhava ucyate //*

iha pṛthivyādayaḥ saṃnipatitā adṛṣṭāṅkuranirvartanaśaktayas tadbhāve kālaparivāsenāṅkuropalambhāt / tad ayaṃ jñātakāraṇayoga iti sambhavī bhavati jñātakāraṇayogasya <niṣpād[an]enārthitāyām> tatkāraṇasambharaṇenābhinirvartanāt / tad yathāivamādikāryaṃ sambhavi kathyate jñātakāraṇatvāt tathā deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṛṣṭārthasākṣātkārijñānaṃ sambhavy uktaṃ vijñātakāraṇatvāt / ayam eva ca sambhava ucyate yad idaṃ jñātakāraṇaṃ nāma idaṃ pramāṇādhitatam sarvārthopalambhakāraṇam iti pratyaye sambhavi sārvajñyam / na ca śāśaviṣāṇādivad apratītam apy asambhavi syāt / <.. ..> samagrāṇāṃ tatkāraṇānāṃ yogyatvāvagamaḥ / The Tucci photograph of the MS being badly out of focus, the text provided here as well as my translation remain tentative. For a diplomatic edition of the entire passage, see Eltschinger 2008: 140–141.

cultivation], because one cannot remove [something] whose nature is unknown;

3 – or, even if knowledge of its nature exists, one, seeing that [moral] faults are permanent, does not undertake any effort to eliminate them, because what is permanent cannot be eliminated;

4 – or, even if [moral faults] are not permanent, one abstains [from engaging in action] upon understanding that [moral faults] are without a cause, because what is autonomous cannot be put to an end;

5 – or, even if [moral faults] possess a cause, one does not interest oneself in [mental] cultivation due to uncertainty (*aniścaya*) about the nature of their cause, because one cannot eliminate [something] whose cause (*nidāna*) is unknown, just as an illness [of unknown cause cannot be eliminated];

6 – or, knowledge of their cause may well exist, but, having understood that their cause is permanent, one who acts rationally does not exert himself to eliminate it, because one cannot hamper a complete cause;

7 – or, even if their cause is impermanent, one, having realized (*avetya*) that [moral] faults are the true nature (*dharmatā*) of living [beings], does not strive [for this nature's destruction], because one cannot remove a nature;

8 – or, even if [moral] faults are not a nature [of living beings], one abstains [from engaging in action] for want of a means towards [their] destruction, because one who lacks a means does not reach his goal;

9 – or, even if a means exists, it might be impracticable due to ignorance of it, because what is of an unknown nature cannot be put into practice;

10 – or, even if one knows [the means toward their destruction], one does not apply [oneself to undertake them], thinking it impossible for [mental] cultivation to reach [its] highest [developmental] degree (*atyantaprakarṣa*), because it is of a limited development (*vyavasthitotkarṣa*), just like jumping, etc., or because [the required] rebirth[-series] is impossible;

11 – or, since [mental cultivation] can reach [its] highest [developmental] degree, destroying [moral] faults may well result from the rise of [their] antidote, [but] even so, one does not apply [oneself to undertake it], thinking it possible that [moral] faults [will then] arise again, just as the solidity of copper, etc., [does].¹¹⁹

¹¹⁹ TSP_K 871,12–872,1/TSP_§ 1054,19–1055,13/Pe56,9–57,17: *na cāpy evaṃ*

To discuss Kamalaśīla's rejection of all these hypothetical reasons for not engaging in mental cultivation would lead us much too far.¹²⁰

śakyaṃ vaktum – saiva tādrśī bhāvanā na kasyacit sambhavati, yā tathābhūtapratyakṣajñānaphalā bhaved iti, yato 'sambhave kāraṇaṃ vacanīyam. tathā hi bhāvanāyāṃ aprayoge sarveṣāṃ evānarthitvaṃ vā kāraṇaṃ bhavet, prekṣāvataḥ pravṛtter arthitayā vyāptatvāt. saty apy arthitve praheyasvarūpārijñānād vā na pravartate prekṣāvān, anirjñātasvarūpasya doṣasya hātum aśakyatvāt. saty api tatsvarūpajñāne nityatvaṃ vā doṣānāṃ paśyaṃs tatprahāṇāya na yatnam ārabhate, nityasya prahāṇāsambhavāt. asaty api vā nityatve nirhetukatvam eṣāṃ avagamya nivartate, svatantrasyāsambhavaducchedatvāt. saty api vā kāraṇavattve tatkāraṇasvarūpāniścayān⁽¹⁾ nādrīyate bhāvanāyāṃ, avijñātanidānasya vyādher⁽²⁾ iva prahātum aśakyatvāt. bhavatu vā tatkāraṇaparijñānam, kiṃ tu⁽³⁾ tatkāraṇaṃ nityam avagamya notsahate tatprahāṇāya prekṣāpūrvakārī, avikalakāraṇasya pratibaddhum⁽⁴⁾ aśakyatvāt. anityatve 'pi vā tatkāraṇasya doṣānāṃ prāṇidharmatām avetya na prayatate, svabhāvasya hātum aśakyatvāt. asvabhāvavte 'pi⁽⁵⁾ vā doṣānāṃ kṣayopāyāsambhavān nivartate, na hy upāyavikalasyopeyasamprāptir asti. sattve 'pi vo⁽⁶⁾ pāyasya tadaparijñānād asambhavat-tadanuṣṭhāno bhavet, aparijñātasvarūpānuṣṭhānāsambhavāt. pariñāne 'pi vā laṅghanādivad vyavasthito⁽⁷⁾tkarṣatayā janmāntarāsambhavena vā bhāvanāyā atyantaprakarṣam asambhāvayan nābhīyogavān bhavati. bhavatu vātyantaprakarṣagamanasambhavāt pratipakṣodaye-na doṣānāṃ kṣayaḥ, tathāpi tāmrādikāṭhinyavat punar api doṣodayaṃ sambhāvayan nābhīyogam ārabhata iti.

⁽¹⁾°āniścayān em. < Tib. : °āniścayād api Jaisalmer MS, Pātan MS, TSP_K, TSP_S, Pe; ⁽²⁾vyādher em. : vyādhir Jaisalmer MS, Pātan MS, TSP_K, TSP_S, Pe; ⁽³⁾kiṃ tu em. < Tib. : kiṃ Jaisalmer MS, Pātan MS, TSP_K, TSP_S, Pe; ⁽⁴⁾pratibaddhum Jaisalmer MS : pratibaddhum Pātan MS, TSP_K, TSP_S, Pe; ⁽⁵⁾'pi Jaisalmer MS, Tib. : Pātan MS, TSP_K, TSP_S, Pe om. 'pi; ⁽⁶⁾vo° em. : co° Jaisalmer MS, Pātan MS, TSP_K, TSP_S, Tib., Pe; ⁽⁷⁾°laṅghanādivad vyavasthito° Jaisalmer MS, Pātan MS : °laṅghanād iva vyavasthito° TSP_K, TSP_S : °laṅghanādīva vyavasthito° Pe : mchoṅs pa la sogs pa bzin du khyad par mi gnas pa ñid kyis Tib.

¹²⁰ Reason 1 is answered in TSP_K 872,1–16/TSP_S 1055,14–1056,7; reason 2 is answered in TSP_K 872,16–18/TSP_S 1056,8–10; reasons 3 and 4 are answered in TSP_K 872,18–22/TSP_S 1056,11–15; reason 5 is answered in TSP_K 872,22–24/TSP_S 1056,16–17; reason 6 is not answered separately; reason 7 is answered in TSP_K 872,24–873,19/TSP_S 1056,18–1057,18; reason 8 is answered in TSP_K 873,19–22/TSP_S 1057,19–22; reason 9 is answered in TSP_K 873,22–24/TSP_S 1057,23–1058,2; reason 10 is answered in TSP_K 873,24–28/TSP_S 1058,3–6; reason 11 is answered in

Suffice it to say here that a systematic dismissal of the entire list amounts to demonstrating the possibility of mental cultivation and hence salvation.

2.5.5. Kamalaśīla's elaboration on the possibility and rationality of salvational cultivation is indebted to Devendrabuddhi's comments on a key passage of PV 2. In this passage, Dharmakīrti describes the future Buddha's rational reflection on the eve of his long career. Although the terminology that is typical of the revised *kāryānumāna* theorem is absent from Dharmakīrti's and Devendrabuddhi's account, it seems fairly certain that both authors envisioned the *bodhisattva* as an eminently rational person assessing the possibility of eliminating suffering for his own and other beings' sake. And indeed, Devendrabuddhi's commentary on PV 2.131cd–132ab provides us with the earliest explicit association between practical rationality and Buddhist soteriology. In so doing, Dharmakīrti and Devendrabuddhi turned the Buddha into a paradigmatic case of practical rationality and the archetype of their own religio-philosophical programme. In these four *pādas*, which I interpret as a functional equivalent of the Mahāyānist *bodhicittotpāda*,¹²¹ Dharmakīrti says:

[Wishing to calm other people's suffering,] the compassionate [*bodhisattva*] engages in [the cultivation of] means [to calm suffering] in order to eradicate [his own] suffering: for whom the goal and [its] cause remain imperceptible, it is indeed a difficult task to [correctly] teach [others] about them.¹²²

Devendrabuddhi concludes his commentary with the following remark:

Since he who ignores the path is not qualified to indicate the correct path [to other people], a rational [person] who wishes to correctly

TSP_k 873,28–874,16/TSP_ś 1058,6–1059,1.

¹²¹ See Eltschinger 2011, §5 and especially §5.4.

¹²² PV 2.131cd–132ab: *dayāvān duḥkhahānārtham upāyeṣv abhiyujyate // parokṣopeyataddhetos tadākhyānaṃ hi duṣkaram /*. On this passage, see in general Eltschinger 2005: 397–408.

teach living beings the [goal] and its cause realizes [them] directly (*sākṣātKR*) [himself].¹²³

The practical rationality at stake is best shown in the following hierarchical structure of aims (*upeya*) and means (*upāya*). In order to eradicate other beings' suffering, i.e., in order to help other beings, the *bodhisattva* must eradicate his own suffering. But in order to do so, he must realize the path himself, and in order to do that, the *bodhisattva* must investigate this path, especially its very *possibility*. Let me summarize here Devendrabuddhi's account of this rational *bodhisattva*'s initial steps towards the wisdom born of reflection.¹²⁴ As we know, the *bodhisattva* wishes to rid himself of his own suffering (defined here as rebirth). He will then wonder first whether this aim is *possible* at all. The removal of suffering can only be achieved if suffering possesses an impermanent and hence destructible cause, for the *bodhisattva* knows from an analysis of causality in general (*hetumātra*) that the only way to destroy an effect is to destroy its cause. If suffering is permanent (*nitya*), then suffering is either causeless (*ahetuka*, *nirhetuka*) or endowed with an agent that makes it permanent (*nityakartr[ka]*). And if suffering is without a cause (i.e., autonomous, *svatantra*) or possesses a permanent agent (i.e., a

¹²³ PVP D54b7–55a1/P62a7–b1: *lam mi śes pas phyin ci ma log pa'i lam ston pa'i skabs med pa'i phyir*⁽¹⁾ *re žig rtog pa dañ ldan pa ñid sems can rnams la de ñid dañ de'i rgyu ji ltar gnas pa bžin du 'chad par bžed pas mñon sum du mdzad pa yin no //*.

⁽¹⁾Note Vibh. 57 n. 2: *na hy amārgajño 'viparītamārgopadeśe 'dhikriyate /*.

¹²⁴ See PVP D55a2–56a1/P62b3–63b4 (Śākyabuddhi's notes in PVT Ñe P143a2–b5 are very helpful). Devendrabuddhi comments here PV 2.132cd–134a₁: *yuktyāgamābhyāṃ vimṛśan duḥkhaḥetuṃ parīkṣate // tasyānityādirūpaṃ ca duḥkhasyaiva viśeṣaṇaiḥ / yatas tathā sthite hetau nirvṛttir neti paśyati // phalasya...* "Reflecting [on the means and the goal] through reason(ing) and scripture, [the compassionate *bodhisattva*] inquires into the cause of the suffering [that must be eradicated] and, through the properties (*viśeṣaṇa*) of suffering itself, [he also inquires] into the impermanent nature, etc., of the [cause in question]. The *bodhisattva* inquires into the cause and its properties], for in this way [he who wishes to eradicate suffering] sees that there is no end to the effect as long as the cause remains."

permanently complete cause, *avikala*), then it cannot be destroyed. The *bodhisattva* can safely conclude that suffering must be impermanent (*anitya*). One can observe that some types of suffering are occasional (*kādācitka*) and hence must have a cause (for if they were causeless, suffering would be either always present or always absent). But if suffering is occasional, then its cause must be occasional too. Now that our rational *bodhisattva* has acquainted himself with the impermanence of the cause and hence with the very possibility of a salvational path, he still has to inquire into the factor (*dharma*) that opposes (*viruddha*, *virodhi*) this cause, in other words, the antidote (*pratipakṣa*, *vipakṣa*, *bādhaka*) whose cultivation (*abhyāsa*, *bhāvanā*) will prove capable of eliminating this cause.¹²⁵ This is expressed in the following passage:

He inquires into the antidote of the cause [of suffering] in order to eliminate it. [As for the factor forming] the antidote to this [cause, this] is also ascertained by the [*bodhisattva*'s] understanding of the nature of the cause [itself. This] cause is attachment to dispositions, [an attachment that] is due to the belief in self and one's own; as for the antidote to this [cause], it is the perception of selflessness (*nairātmyadarśana*), which is incompatible with it.¹²⁶

The *bodhisattva* is well aware of the fact that if a mental state *x* is an antidote to a mental state *y*, then *x* and *y* display contrary modes of grasping a given object (*viparītālambanākāra*).¹²⁷ The cause of suffering consists in an attachment or thirst (*trṣṇā*) that bears on the (painful, *duḥkhabhūta*) conditioning factors (*saṃskāra*), and grasps them as self and one's own (*ātmātmīya*), although they are entirely devoid of these.¹²⁸ The antidote to the cause of suffering must be a factor that grasps these painful mental dispositions as being free of self

¹²⁵ See PVP D56a2-3/P63b6-7 and PVP D56a4/P63b8-64a1.

¹²⁶ PV 2.134a₂-135: *hetor hānārthaṃ tadvipakṣaṃ parīkṣate / sādhyate tadvipakṣo 'pi heto rūpāvabodhataḥ // ātmātmīyagrahakarṭaḥ snehaḥ saṃskāragocaraḥ / hetur virodhi nairātmyadarśanaṃ tasya bādhakam //*.

¹²⁷ Note PVP D56a5-6/P64a2-3 and PVṬ Ñe P143b5: *dmigs pa ni yul yin la de'i 'dzin pa'i rnam pa yin no //*.

¹²⁸ See PVP D56b1/P64a5-6, PVP D56b1-2/P64a7 = PVV 58,5-6, PVP D56b3-4/P64b1-2 as well as PVṬ Ñe P144a1-2.

and one's own. It can then only consist in the perception of selflessness, whose uninterrupted cultivation brings about the elimination of suffering through the gradual uprooting (*unmūlana*) of its cause.

Conclusion

The 6th century CE is most likely to have been a time of duress for the Indian Buddhist communities, as they had simultaneously to face brahmanical hostility and compete with Śaivas for patronage. One group of Buddhist intellectuals felt compelled to meet this new challenge by going beyond internecine quarrels and turning to new, non-Buddhist targets and audiences. This involved abandoning earlier methodologies and language and putting less emphasis on soteriological concerns and dogmatic elaboration. From this point in time, significant segments of the Buddhist elites' discourse would be concerned with criticizing doctrinal tenets of non-Buddhists, neutralizing their attacks on Buddhism, and developing apologetic strategies designed to defend Buddhism as the only rational and hence possible path to salvation. These intellectuals evolved entirely new patterns of Buddhist self-assertion that centred on appeals to critical rationality. They turned earlier, mainly Yogācāra hermeneutic devices into evaluative and apologetic tools that they grounded in an epistemologically based anthropology. Ordinary human beings are cognitively limited, hence lack any access to the supersensible realm, and thus are doomed to uncertainty when engaging in action concerning the fulfilment of their practical expectations. In other words, practically rational persons are left with no other possibility than to maximize the probability of everyday as well as religious success by relying on reason(ing). Rational agents are expected to, and actually do infer the possibility of the expected result from the completeness and effectiveness of its causes. This applies of course to everyday actions, but also to scripturally based soteriological practice; indeed, the set of evaluative criteria developed by Dharmakīrti has no other purpose than enabling one to infer the plausibility of a scripture's reliability. But the Buddhist epistemologists' concept of practical rationality was not only meant to apply in the descriptive and nor-

mative framework of anthropology. It also provided their literary production with an ideal addressee that suited the 6th-century rhetorical concern with rationality as the only criterion for deciding between competing truth-claims. Furthermore, this concept provided their apologetic endeavours on behalf of Buddhism with a theoretical and methodological foundation. It is hardly surprising, then, that these philosophers read their epistemological, religious and apologetic programme into the Buddha himself, whose personality and undertakings were now interpreted as the embodiment of practical rationality. In doing this, the Buddhist epistemologists represented Buddhism as an eminently rational religion based on the paradigmatically rational and altruistic person of its founder.

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- ASBh – Nathmal Tatia: *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣyam*. Patna 1976: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, 17).
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- BC – *Buddhacarita* (Aśvaghōṣa). Cited from Honjo 1993.
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- BKGA – Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens
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W = Unrai Wogihara: *Bodhisattvabhūmi. A Statement of Whole Course of the Bodhisattva (Being Fifteenth Section of Yogācārabhūmi)*. Tokyo 1971 (1930–1936¹): Sankibo Buddhist Book Store.
- BoBh_T – *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, Tibetan version. D 4037, Wi 1b1–213a7/P 5538, Źi 1b1–247a8.
- BoBhVṛ – *Bodhisattvabhūmivṛtti* (Guṇaprabha). D 4044, 'I 141a1–182a2/P 5545, Yi 176a3–229a6.
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MAV – *Madhyāntavibhāga*. See MAVBh.

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MSA(Bh) – Sylvain Lévi: *Asaṅga. Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṅkāra, Exposé de la doctrine du Grand Véhicule selon le système Yogācāra*. Tome I: texte. Paris 1907: Librairie Honoré Champion.

MSaṅg – See Lamotte 1973: I.

MSAVBh – *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāravṛttibhāṣya* (Sthiramati). D 4034, *Mi* 1b1–*Tsi* 266a7/P 5531, *Mi* 1–*Tsi* 308a8.

MSU – *Mahāyānasaṅgrahopaniśandhana* (Asvabhāva). D 4051, *Ri* 190b1–296a7/P 5552, *Li* 232b5–356b7.

MVy – I.P. Minaev: *Mahāvyūtpatti*. Delhi 1992: Sri Satguru Publications (St. Petersburg 1911¹: Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica Series, 98).

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- NBT – *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (Dharmottara). See DhPr.
- NBh – *Nyāyabhāṣya* (Pakṣilasvāmin/Vātsyāyana). See NS.
- NS – *Nyāyasūtra* (Akṣapāda Gautama). Anantalal Thakur: *Gautamīyanyāyadarśana with Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana*. Delhi 1997: Indian Council of Philosophical Research (Nyāyacaturgranthikā, 1).
- NV – Anantalal Thakur: *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika of Bhāradvāja Uddyotakara*. Delhi 1997: Indian Council of Philosophical Research (Nyāyacaturgranthikā, 2).
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- *PS – **Prayogasāra*. See *UH.
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- PV 1–4 – Yusho Miyasaka: “*Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā* (Sanskrit and Tibetan).” *Acta Indologica* 2 (1971–1972), pp. 1–206. See also PVV; for PV 1, see also PVSV; for PV 2.131cd–285, see also Vetter 1990. My numbering of the verses in PV 2 follows Vetter’s.
- PVin 1–2 – Ernst Steinkellner: *Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya, Chapters 1 and 2*. Beijing/Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House/Austrian Academy of Sciences Press (Sanskrit Texts from the Tibetan Autonomous Region, 2).
- PVin_T 2 – Ernst Steinkellner: *Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam. Teil I, Tibetischer Text und Sanskrittexte*. Wien 1973: VÖAW.

- PVinṬ – *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* (Dharmottara). D 4229, *Dze* 1b1–*Tshe* 178a3/P 5727, *Dze* 1b1–*We* 209b8.
- PVP – *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* (Devendrabbuddhi). D 4217, *Che* 1–326b4/P 5717, *Che* 1–390a8.
- PVSV – Raniero Gnoli: *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. The First Chapter with the Auto-Commentary*. Roma 1960: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente (Serie Orientale Roma, 23).
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- SNS – *Samḍhinirmocanasūtra*. See Lamotte 1935.
- ŚrBh – (1) Śrāvakaabhūmi Study Group: *Śrāvakaabhūmi. Revised Sanskrit Text and Japanese Translation. The First Chapter*. Tokyo 1988: The Institute for Comprehensive Studies of Buddhism (Taisho University), The Sankibo Press (Taisho University Sogo Bukkyo Kenkyujo Series, 4). (2) Karuneshu Shukla: *Śrāvakaabhūmi of Ācārya Asaṅga*. Patna 1973: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, 14).
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TJ – [Madhyamakahr̥daya]Tarkajvālā (Bhāviveka/Bhavya) on Madhyamakahr̥dayakārikā 9. D 3856, Dza 271a3–320b5/P 5256, Dza 306a2–367b6.

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TrBh – Hartmut Buescher: *Sthiramati’s Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya. Critical Edition of the Sanskrit Text and its Tibetan Translation*. Wien 2007: VÖAW (BKGA 57).

TS(P)_κ – Embar Krishnamacharya: *Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita With the*

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TSP_T – *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*, Tibetan version. D 4267, Ze 133b1-'E 331a7/P 5765, 'E 159b2-'Ye 405a7.

TS_T – *Tattvasaṅgraha*, Tibetan version. D 4266, Ze 1b1–133a4/P 5764, 'E 1b1–159a6.

*UH – **Upāyahrdaya*. Giuseppe Tucci: *Pre-Dignāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources*. Baroda 1929: Oriental Institute (Gaekwad Oriental Series, 49).

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VinSg – *Viniścayasaṅgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. D 4038, Ži 1b1–Zi 127a4/P 5539, Zi 1b1 – 'I 142b8.

VNT – *Vādanyāyaṭīkā* (Śāntarakṣita). Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana: “Dharmakīrti's *Vādanyāya*. With the Commentary of Śāntarakṣita.” Published as an appendix of the *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society* 21–22, 1935–1936.

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